$1.50 April 22, 1988

COMMONWEAL

#00799TBN #015 8812
ST CHARLES SEM LIB
CARTHAGENA STA
CELINA OH 45822

TO INSTRUCT THE IGNORANT
Sidney Callahan

THE RETURN TO POPULISM
Fred Siegel

J. BRYAN HEHIR on Paul Ramsey
JOHN GARVEY on Family Photographs
RUSSELL W. GIBBONS on Pittsburgh

BOOKS

DREW CHRISTIANSEN on Daniel Callahan

VIRGINIA M. BOUVIER on Chile

J.M. CAMERON on Technology

PETER MARKS on AIDS



St. Charles Seminary Library
Carthagena, Ohio

OCCUPYING EACH OTHER
ISRAEL & THE PALESTINIANS
Mitchell Cohen

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CORRESPONDENCE

Morsels of gore

New York, N.Y.

To the Editors: I would love to believe Richard Dieter ["The Death Penalty Dinosaur," January 15] when he argues fiscal concern will help ease capital punishment into extinction. But consider the energy and resources devoted to the simulation of violence and death in popular media. Consider the hours spent before televisions and movie screens devouring every last morsel of gore. What price won't the public pay for the real thing?

KEVIN M. DOYLE

Down with death row

Richmond, Va.

To the Editors: I share Richard Dieter's stubborn confidence ["The Death Penalty Dinosaur," January 15] that one day "the American people may well combine to strike down once and for all the notion that there is a clean and proper way to kill another human being under the state's total control." Furthermore, I am grateful to him for reminding all of us who claim to be "pro-life" of how important it is to rededicate ourselves to the struggle so that the day, when the death penalty achieves dinosaur status, will come soon, before many more of our sisters and brothers on death row join the tragic company of those for whom it will have come too late.

WALTER F. SULLIVAN
Bishop of Richmond

A Rambo solution

Denver, Colo.

To the Editors: Richard Dieter's hope that the death penalty will be relegated to the same grave as dinosaurs needs to be heard by Americans, especially our Catholic community. Despite the polls with their misleading results, the support for the death penalty is a mile wide but an inch deep.

The state should not be in the business of killing people. It is hardly a surprise that this administration's policy of resolving conflict through violent means should extend to a tiny number of people who commit homicide, mainly the poor and minorities. Most of the states follow this Rambo solution. The USSR, Iran, South Africa, and China kill their citizens through capital punishment also, but none of our allies does.

JIM SUNDERLAND

Civilized or not

Mt. Calvary, Wis.

To the Editors: Maybe Richard Dieter is right. Maybe we have developed a sense of humanity that will rightfully place capital punishment in the company of the dinosaurs. However, I don't think it will happen if we pursue some of the thoughts expressed in "The Death Penalty Dinosaur."

Dieter refers to the number of persons waiting "to be gassed, hanged, shocked, shot, or injected." He follows up with, "The Holocaust." To suggest that prisoners guilty of heinous crimes belong in the same category as innocent victims of the Holocaust is repulsive. Survivors of Nazism, or relatives of those who suffered and died in the death camps, must, I would think, be greatly offended by Dieter's comparison. This approach does little to strengthen any argument against capital punishment.

Dieter uses statistics to argue that the death penalty is dying on its own. But some of these could just as validly be used to support legal killing. The high cost of capital trials, the subsequent appeals, and the housing of death-row prisoners over relatively long periods of time sound costly indeed. However, one could conclude that rather than eliminate capital punishment, the state should speed up the process.

Dieter writes about the supposed deterrent effect of capital punishment: "If they (criminals) really weigh the odds, they'll realize that 1 out of 200 murderers receives the death penalty, and that at present far fewer are executed, some many years down the road." But, rather than eliminate the death penalty, wouldn't it be better to redistribute the odds? If the odds were high that they would be executed if convicted of murder, it seems reasonable that capital punishment could be an effective deterrent. . . .

If capital punishment is a relic of a more barbaric past, we need to attack the idea of the death penalty without resorting to arguments that may strengthen the position of those who want to keep it.

PAUL CRAIG

Two-edged swords

Washington, D.C.

To the Editors: This morning I read in the *Washington Post* about two twenty-five-year-old Pakistanis who had been sentenced to death. Their crime was adultery. Their fate is to be buried up to their necks and stoned until they are dead.

This afternoon I read the excellent article about capital punishment by Richard Dieter. Here in the United States, the fate of the two thousand men, women, and children on death row is to be gassed, hanged, shot, electrocuted, or injected until they are dead. For a few moments I wondered if my job as Director of the National Coalition to Abolish

(Continued on page 254)

Commonweal is indexed in Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature, Catholic Periodical Index, Index of American Periodical Verse, Book Review Digest and Book Review Index. Microfilm from Vol. 1, 1924, to current issues available through University Microfilm, 300 N. Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, MI 48106 and on Microfiche from Bell & Howell, Wooster, Ohio 44691. Serials Data program No.: ISSN 0010-3330. Second-class postage paid at New York, N.Y. Copyright © 1988 Commonweal Foundation.

Illustrations: Cover and p. 250, Valerry; p. 229, Wicks; p. 230, Rogers, *Pittsburgh Press*; p. 232, photo, Matthews; p. 234, Antonucci; p. 236, Bas., *Tachydromos*, Greece; p. 239, Charlot; p. 240, MacKenzie; p. 242, Kirk; p. 248, Ross, Rothco.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

COMMONWEAL

CONTENTS

Volume CXV, Number 8

Correspondence	226
Editorials	227
Remaking cities: *Russell W. Gibbons*	229
Remembering Paul Ramsey: *J. Bryan Hehir*	232
Family photographs: *John Garvey*	233
Occupying each other: *Mitchell Cohen*	235
To instruct the ignorant: *Sidney Callahan*	238
The return to populism: *Fred Siegel*	241
Screen: *Tom O'Brien*	244
Stage: *Gerald Weales*	245
Verse: *John Nixon, Jr.*	231
Edward Nobles	251

BOOKS

Setting Limits/Born to Pay: *Drew Christiansen*	247
Chile: *Virginia M. Bouvier*	249
Technology and Justice: *J. M. Cameron*	250
And the Band Played On: *Peter Marks*	252

STAFF

Editor: Margaret O'Brien Steinfels
Associate Editors: David Toolan, Karen Sue Smith, Patrick Jordan
Production Editor: Anne Robertson
Associate Prod. Editor: Patricia Mazzola
Poetry: Rosemary Deen
Movies: Tom O'Brien
Staff: Harriette Balsky, Janice Gates, John A. Black
Student Intern: Kathleen McGarvey
Advertising Manager: Ruth E. Taylor
Publisher: Edward S. Skillin

Commonweal, [ISSN 0010-3330] A Review of Public Affairs, Religion, Literature, and the Arts, is published biweekly, except monthly Christmas-New Year's and July and August, by Commonweal Foundation, 15 Dutch St., New York, N.Y. 10038. Telephone: (212) 732-0800. Single copy, $1.50. Yearly subscriptions, U.S., $28; Canada,- $30; foreign, $33. Special two-year rate: U.S., $49; Canada, $53; foreign, $59. All Canadian and foreign subscriptions must be paid in U.S. dollars by International Money Order or by check on a U.S. bank. POSTMASTER: Send address changes to Commonweal, 15 Dutch St. New York, N.Y. 10038.

Dear John

"You've come a long way, bishops!" That's the first thing to be said about the first draft of the bishops' pastoral on women's concerns. And the second is: "You still have a long way to go." A decade ago this pastoral could not have have been written. The testimony of tens of thousands of women before diocesan commissions and national organizations, and in hearings organized by the drafting committee, has been heard and the bishops have taken it to heart. The straight-talking voices of many women, quoted in the text, constitute the expert testimony analogous to that of economists and arms controllers consulted by the bishops in writing the pastorals on the economy and on war and peace. Yet in most respects, the women's testimony is neither formally representative nor expert.

This framework lets women describe their experiences with men, with society, with the church; it creates room for words of sorrow, pain, outrage, and disagreement as well as of appreciation and praise—words and experiences that the six-member drafting committee could not appropriately speak itself. In the bishops' own responses are echoes of the painful examination of conscience that they clearly have had to undertake on hearing these critical words directed at men, but especially at themselves. In some cases, predictable restatements of church teaching, for example the prohibition against women's ordination, are couched with explicit and courteous recognition of widespread questioning by theologians and others. In other cases more direct changes are proposed by the bishops— opening the diaconate and minor orders to women is virtually endorsed.

Differences among women based on race, class, education, and their divergent choices about work and family are implicitly recognized and responded to. So is the no-win situation of many women subject to demeaning remarks and attitudes no matter what path they choose or have forced upon them, be it full-time parenting, parenting and full-time career, single parenthood, or remaining single. The letter notes, for example, that Hispanic women must often live with social pressures that extol the role of mother, economic pressures that require them to work, and cultural pressures that keep them from acquiring the education that would allow them to hold good jobs.

For preaching and teaching purposes, there is a clear-cut declaration that sexism is a moral and social evil. The bishops "regret and confess our individual and collective failures to respond to women as they deserve." The bishops enumerate these evils of sexism in both blatant and subtle forms: rape, pornography, exploitation, abuse, job and wage discrimination, contempt, and condescending words and behavior. While acknowledging that there are men who "shun any oppression of women," the bishops also say that "we [men] must courageously examine our attitudes for prejudices and stereotypes acquired in society which imply the inferior-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ity of women or which have led to the perhaps unconscious assimilation of a concept of masculinity marked by domination and violence, sexual aggression, and indulgence.'' For example, the letter cites the report of women that ''priest counselors told them to 'offer up to God' the abuse of their husbands.'' ''Attitudes tending toward [sexism] or an incapacity to deal with women as equals,'' the bishops judge to be ''negative indications for fitness for ordination.'' Finally, the letter insists that men ''take seriously their responsibility in the realms of sexuality, procreation, and parenting.''

These details point to the letter's real strength. The church has listened to the great diversity of women who are members of its body. It has consulted the experience of many whose talents and aspirations are unjustly overlooked, especially in the church. Through the letter the bishops have used their office as a medium for urging reconciliation and reform, in particular, calling men to an examination of patterns and attitudes that regard women as inferior.

But what women have said to the bishops and what is written in the letter is certainly not all that women are saying. The pastoral is not at the cutting edge of the social, cultural, psychological, and economic issues still being raised by the changing status of women, nor is that cutting edge an appropriate or credible place for the bishops. Rather, the pastoral sums up and consolidates the personal, familial, and existential realities that the women's movement raised to consciousness in its first decade-and-a-half. The pastoral looks at those issues from the point of view of ''our Catholic heritage,'' a heritage that at times is affirming—for example, about equal pay for equal work, affirmative action programs, and day care—while at other times it is counter-cultural—for example, about divorce where it provides a critical gloss to routinely accepted secular attitudes. And then there is avoidance: The carefully crafted words on women's ordination struck us and will be read by many, perhaps even some bishops, as an equivocation and evasion of the church's own sin of sexism.

The pastoral is not a work of critical analysis. The committee did not conduct a public inquiry or write a draft at the same level of theoretical sophistication as the pastorals on the economy and on war and peace. The emphasis on experiences and feelings overshadows fact and analysis. This overall framework, a great strength in airing criticisms and grievances, becomes a barrier to another level of understanding—one that considers the concerns of women because of their accomplishments.

The ''expert testimony'' is mainly that of victims who tell a story of oppression. Its constant reiteration in the letter gives the effect of seeming to be the only story. One paradoxical outcome of this strategy is that women end up being catalogued primarily in terms of their relationship to men. They are mothers, wives, parents, halves of engaged couples; they are single, separated, divorced. Too often the remedies proposed for sexist behaviors seem to depend on male initiative. The appeal against sexism produces its own sexist outcome. The language of victims and the image of victims eclipse the language of moral agency and the image of women as actors and authors of their own lives.

Women are other than, more than, sex objects and sex subjects. They are politicians, policy makers, union leaders, teachers, pastoral workers, assembly line supervisors, journalists, employers, consumers, citizens. They earn and they spend; they send off that one and summon another; they choose one interpretation over another. Increasingly, women are achieving power. When they have more of it, will they handle it any better than men have? Is it sexist to suggest that they could, and should? Maybe the bishops should struggle with that puzzle as they continue to consult and begin work on the next draft of their pastoral.

Something of these second-order problems also characterizes the discussion on contraception. As the letter says, women's voices need to be heard in the church's teaching on sexuality and marriage, and parents need support and reinforcement in forming their children's attitudes and behaviors. But in holding to the ban on artificial contraception, the bishops cripple the church's ability to come to grips with the sexual revolution that has come in the wake of the contraceptive one. The church cannot merely restate norms and ideals, it must think, teach, discuss, and act within a fundamentally altered moral universe where the fear of pregnancy can no longer be counted on as a sanction to enforce church teaching about sex and marriage.

The bishops still have a long way to go. The drafting committee admits that. But we all have a long way to go. The letter will have its critics, both those who think the bishops have no real moral credibility in speaking about women, and those who think that they squander their moral authority in giving voice to feminist criticisms.

But finally this letter is a cause for hope and a starting point for a new conversation first of all, among the whole body of U.S. bishops at their meeting in June and between women and men in the church. Ultimately, however, the bishops must press these issues with Rome if their conviction and credibility is to be taken seriously.

LE MEESERABLE

The longer Attorney General Edwin Meese remains head of the Department of Justice, the longer justice will wait to be served.

That is not the conclusion of partisan opponents or a hostile media. It is the verdict of six of the attorney general's own deputies who voted last month with their feet. One of them, William Weld, head of the department's Criminal Division, put it succinctly: For him, Mr. Meese's staying on raised the ''question of moral authority and the tarnishing of the department.'' If Meese would not step down, Weld must.

Mr. Meese's problems are both legal and administrative. The legal problems antedate his tenure as attorney general. His confirmation was delayed nearly a year as a special prosecutor

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

investigated Meese's financial dealings and political appointments while chief counselor to the president. Since his confirmation in 1985, two other special prosecutors have been assigned to investigate Meese's association with the Wedtech scandal and possible involvement in the $1 billion Iraqi pipeline deal. Special Prosecutor James McKay this month announced that as of now there is insufficient evidence to bring specific indictments against Meese in either case. McKay has indicated that he will forward the investigations to the Office of Government Ethics and the Justice Department's own Office of Professional Responsibility for further review. That does not trouble the attorney general. His all-or-nothing view is: no indictment, no resignation.

Is this any way to head a department that should be synonymous with propriety? As attorney general, Mr. Meese's concerns have focused not on the business of the country, but on the business of his own self-defense. As a result of his legal problems, he is now barred from participating in an unprecedented number of cases before the Justice Department. These include cases involving the Teamsters, the Stock Market's insider trading scandal, and any matter related to independent counsels. His haste to paper over the disorder caused by the six resignations led him to announce two top appointments before they received full White House approval. Shades of the Ginsburg nomination.

The Justice Department under Mr. Meese has a record of ill-conceived, politically motivated nominations (Bork, Ginsburg, and Siegan), not to mention the appeal to partisan theories ("jurisprudence of original intent"). The attorney general has been inept at reading the signs of the times (the Cuban detainees' riot) and of coming to grips with internal, departmental racism (the FBI). The failure of his touted drug war can be read in the streets. With Meese's approval, the administration has made misrepresentations to Congress. As the *Wall Street Journal* reported (April 4), internal cost estimates have been doctored and lawmakers supplied with misleading documents related to drug enforcement programs. The majority report of the congressional Iran-*contra* committee last November questioned the attorney general's "competence and professionalism." It concluded that the president had been "poorly served" by his attorney general. The Office of Government Ethics found in 1985 that in certain financial transactions, Meese "had created the appearance of impropriety." Last year the same office noted that the attorney general had misrepresented his personal financial reports while attorney general. As head of the Justice Department, Mr. Meese has shown a curious unwillingness to investigate possible illegalities, to anticipate conflicts of interest, and to remember important details of administration policy-making (340 such lapses of memory before the congressional Iran- *contra* committee alone).



With Meese unable to remember and refusing to depart, we can expect further erosion of confidence within the department: more infighting, gridlock in appointments, and further diminishment of the attorney general's own power. Eleven members of the House Judiciary Committee have asked Mr. Meese to step aside voluntarily until all pending federal investigations into his conduct have been completed. Elliot Richardson has gone even further and asked him to step down. We agree. In Hopkins's wise phrase, "the just man justices." That can hardly be said of the current head of the Department of Justice.

REPORT FROM PITTSBURGH

REMAKING CITIES

WHEN ARCHITECTS & ACTIVISTS MEET

"It's not the 'Valley of the Mon,' Harold," the British journalist admonished his colleague, "It is the Mon Valley." "The Mon" is the Monongahela River Valley, a stretch of twenty miles snaking southeasterly to where it meets the Ohio River and glass skyscrapers and art deco exteriors of renewed downtown Pittsburgh.

Down the Mon it is quite different. The valley is post-industrial, with town after town still in aftershock from the shutdown of Western Pennsylvania's steel industry that began in the 1970s and has only hit bottom in the past year. It is shuttered mills and storefronts covered with plywood.

The press corps from the United Kingdom was in Pittsburgh not so much to analyze the social anthropology of the American rust belt as to see what was new in the business of rebuilding cities. Not only that, but Prince Charles was coming as the honorary chairman of the "Remaking Cities Conference" (March 2-5), an event sponsored by the American Institute of Architects and its British counterpart, the Royal Institute of Architects. Styled an "international forum on urban futures," the conference addressed the reality that according to its sponsors, "the industrial revolution is dying. Smokestacks are coming down and the global economy is emerging."

Pittsburgh was a logical selection for an assessment of a large city built through industrial power and money, but which in the past decade has sustained massive assaults on its traditional manufacturing base. Two decades ago more than

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

200,000 were employed in the greater Pittsburgh steel and metals industries. Coal, glass, aluminum, and the corporate infrastructure that made them work were central to Pittsburgh life.

The Monongahela Valley was the hub of the region's steel industry. Mill towns that were prominent in much of the history of the working people and their unions for half a century were social, economic, and political centers of a rich steelworker culture, entwined with the European immigration of the turn of the century. Homestead, Duquesne, Braddock, Clairton, and McKeesport had huge plants that employed almost 50,000 people in the decade after World War II, the high-water mark of American dominance of the global steel market.

Air travelers who approached Pittsburgh a decade ago would point out the red sky above the Mon, the fires from the blast furnaces and shops lighting up miles along the river. Today an eerie darkness engulfs the region. All but three of the United States Steel plants are closed, including the once proud Homestead Works which employed 15,000 during World War II, and which had more than 8,000 employees just eight years ago. Ghosts of the depression haunt the downtown business stretches of Homestead, Braddock, and McKeesport, where few businesses have survived. Unemployment centers are virtually the only areas of activity.

The post-industrial legacy of abandoned mills, slums, polluted rivers, and declining downtowns was only a prelude to the social consequences of unemployment, broken families, suicide, and home loss—plenty of case studies for the conference planners, who declared that "as we move to the twenty-first century, we must have a clear vision of the quality of urban life we seek to build."

Pittsburgh, in many ways, is a contradiction to the cycle of urban decay attendant to the decline and shutdown of traditional manufacturing industries. The old center city was essentially rebuilt in the 1950s in a marriage between Democratic Mayor David Lawrence and the Mellon family, which led the city's Republican corporate, commercial, and financial power. Cleaned up, "smoky Pittsburgh" became an attractive center for many of America's corporate headquarters.

Even while the mills were being shuttered up in the eighties, the downtown maintained its glitter. U.S. Steel (now USX, seeking in anonymity to escape its failure) built the largest skyscraper between New York and Chicago. Pittsburgh Plate Glass constructed a glass replica of the Gothic Houses of Parliament. On a day when the sun bounces off the skyline, it offers onlookers the sensation of a "city on the hill."

The concept of remaking cities has a wide appeal. The business and financial establishment of greater Pittsburgh is all for rebuilding, while residents in the depressed neighborhoods wish to improve and even restore their former quality of life. Urban planners and regional developers are eager to get on with the post-industrial boom—whatever it might be. And community groups, born in the War on Poverty and nurtured by the open hostility of the Reagan years, have established their participation turf in the plans to revitalize the rust belt

neighborhoods and adjacent mill and factory properties. Real income, income distribution, and the loss of the wealth that was once created by the manufacturing base that has virtually disappeared was a thread that wove through much of the four-day conference.

Surprising to some, Prince Charles himself gave credence to the cause of citizen participation in the process of rebuilding. A critic of postwar British architecture, he declared that "the most essential feature of this debate is how to recreate communities." He made references to "community architecture" and "citizen architecture" which were unsettling to many traditionalists.

Beyond "community architecture," however, others questioned the process itself of building and rebuilding within the traditional structures of maximizing profits for landowners, lenders, developers, and those who seek to control the partnership between the unhampered private sector and the various levels of government. And the "Valley of the Mon," with its desolation following the collapse of steel in the region, has brought diverse forces to the surface which suggest that the old top-down way of regional and inner city redevelopment may not be workable in the twilight of the twentieth century.

Chester Hartman, a fellow of the Institute for Policy Studies in Washington, told a conference workshop that "There is cynicism among many poor people toward the public-private partnership concept because of the performance history of many of those corporate and financial participants." He noted that some of those players who have been involved in plant shutdowns leading to the destruction of the local tax base and who have fought real tax reform, now want to manipulate the public sector in redeveloping the prime industrial sites they have abandoned.

The expected ballyhoo of the prince's visit provided a public theater that both brought attention to and, in the eyes of many, trivialized the problem in the adjacent Monongahela Valley. In advance of the conference and the royal visit, a group of economists, planners, developers, and architects formed a Regional and Urban Design Assistance Team that studied the socio-economic erosion of the Mon Valley and made specific recommendations.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Applauded for holding public hearings and preparing an "action plan," the team found little enthusiasm in the valley for its proposals: an international "garden festival" to be built on the site of the presumed-to-be-demolished Homestead Works, a huge "flea market/trade mart" in a million-square-foot building in McKeesport's National Works, and a trash recycling plant at the Duquesne Works. There was no projection of how many jobs above those of the minimum-wage service sector would be involved in the proposal.

Community groups who have been active in efforts to secure and retain some industrial base in the Mon Valley were visibly disappointed. "Will our industrial heritage disappear and our towns and Pittsburgh become the urban equivalent of Appalachia's abandoned coal patches?" asked Mary Ann Smith O'Nan, a member of the Carnegie Mill Group, an effort to acquire the Homestead Works and retain heavy and light industrial as well as commercial development.

The projections of high technology, health care, and finance as the growth sectors for the post-industrial states have proved a new tech bubble: finance is anything but a growth industry since last October's crash; health care has too few well-paying job categories; and the same goes for high-tech start-ups which involve only small numbers of people. Seemingly ignored have been the proposals to bring back some steel and other manufacturing to the region and to rebuild a base of workers with living wages and benefits that characterized the steel industry of the past four decades.

Advancing this goal in the Mon Valley is a coalition of community and union activists, elected officials, and church people who have formed the Tri-state Conference on Steel (TCS). The group's president, the Reverend Garrett Dorsey, says that the potential for a revitalized metals industry in the valley exists, but that priorities have so far been misplaced. TCS, however, has succeeded in having a "Metals Retention Study" completed by the city and county, and in establishing a unique Steel Valley Authority (SVA). With the possibility of enforcing eminent domain, SVA has forced USX to declare its intentions to include a manufacturing sector in any redevelopment of the Homestead site. Tri-state and SVA officials contend that Homestead and other facilities could be part of future demands for steel, especially in light of the acknowledged need to rebuild the area's bridge, waterway, and underground utility infrastructure by the turn of the century. In February, a study commissioned by the county and Pittsburgh had recommended the South Side facilities of LTV Steel as the site for a start-up of existing electric furnaces, which would create 350 jobs. "We want to prevent speculators and developers from coming in and selling off what is left of the mill machinery and tearing down the remaining structures for scrap before all the options are exercised for metals production again," says SVA member Charles McCollester.

The inevitable cycle of shutdown, disinvestment, and loss of income is coming back to confront directly those who would remake our cities. But remaking cities is an extension of remaking policy. While the realities of a global economy cannot be denied, neither can the fact that America's postwar prosperity grew out of a solid and vigorous industrial base. It created a nation of stable homeowners and consumers, and sent two generations through college.

The next generation to populate the Mon Valley faces the prospect of not living as well as its parents, and of surviving only with two wage-earners to a family. Chester Hartman reminded the conference that almost one quarter of the 30 million renting households in the United States spend over half of their disposable income on housing, "an intolerable situation for millions." The excessive profits of land speculators, high-profit contractors, high-interest lenders and brokers contribute to the dilemma of bringing affordable housing to the growing number of Americans reduced to marginal incomes in the so-called rust belt. "An alternative network of non-profit participants must be established in housing," said Hartman, "with government capital grants replacing loans to low- and moderate-income people. With two-thirds of all housing consumption dollars going to repay the principal and interest on loans, it becomes the only alternative to enable people to obtain housing and make livable communities more than a slogan."

Mary Ann Smith O'Nan summed up a major theme that came to be reiterated throughout the conference. Citizens must be enfranchised to determine policies and guide plans that affect their local communities. "We believe," she said, "that a healthy manufacturing base is necessary to generate adequate wages and incomes so that families and communities can thrive."

RUSSELL W. GIBBONS

Russell W. Gibbons, a previous Commonweal *contributor, is with the Philip Murray Institute of Labor Studies in Pittsburgh. He was communications director of the United Steelworkers of America for nearly a decade.*

John Nixon, Jr.

Most of my Aprils

Most of my Aprils have been harvested
And stored beneath that bony parasol
That fends such dainties from the glaring falls.

What bales of apple-bloom, flasks filled with dew,
Bird-song looped tenderly in lyric skeins
I hoisted to that loft. When autumn rains

Intolerable color on me now,
I love to wander down each pastel aisle,
Remembering the little vernal fool

I never quite outgrew — lean sensualist
Whose nose would not believe that if you smell
One April lilac, you have smelled them all.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

J. Bryan Hehir

REMEMBERING PAUL RAMSEY

'THERE OUGHT TO BE A NATURAL LAW'

Paul Ramsey died last month. *Commonweal* was one of several Catholic periodicals and journals where Ramsey became a familiar participant in moral discussion of topics from marriage to missiles. His death should not pass without a grateful acknowledgment of how broadly and deeply this Methodist moralist influenced Catholic scholars, pastors, and citizens. Ramsey epitomized the kind of in-depth dialogue within the Christian community which the ecumenical age of Vatican II has made possible. His appreciation of the Catholic moral tradition and the specific practical issues he chose to address made him a careful student of Catholic thought, a friendly critic of some of its positions, a catalyst for development of its content.

Ramsey's interest in Catholic theology came in the middle of his professional career; it is unlikely that his formal training inclined him toward Catholic teaching. He took his undergraduate degree at Millsap College in Mississippi, then his doctorate at Yale University where he studied under Richard Niebuhr. His intellectual and professional home was the Department of Religion at Princeton University where he taught for more than thirty years.

Ramsey was an enormously productive scholar whose writings made distinctive contributions to ethics in three areas. First, he was interested in ethical theory, usually setting forth his own position as part of a critique of other philosophers or theologians. This was the approach he used in *Nine Modern Moralists*, and also in his dialogue with Anglo-American moral philosophy in the book he co-edited with Gene Outka, *Norm and Context in Christian Ethics*. An abiding theoretical concern for Ramsey was Catholic natural-law tradition. Ramsey's analysis of Jacques Maritain in *Nine Modern Moralists*, and his participation in Catholic debates about sexual and social ethics sustained his interest in the potential and limits of the natural-law style of reasoning. Charles Curran's systematic review of Ramsey's thought pointed out that one should not conclude from Ramsey's abiding interest in natural law that he espoused a natural-law position. It would be more accurate to say that the natural-law discussion provided a background for Ramsey's two major contributions to applied ethics.

The first was the ethic of war. In the 1950s and 1960s Ramsey was the principal architect of the revival of the just-war theory. In two books, spanning a decade of writing, *War and the Christian Conscience* and *The Just War*, Ramsey probed the foundation of the just-war ethic in Augustine and Aquinas, and then launched a prodigious effort to apply the classical teachings to the radically changed conditions of the nuclear age. Ramsey's engagement with these issues continued until his death. Only a few weeks before serious illness overtook him, he sent to the publishers a critique of the Methodist and Catholic bishops' statements on nuclear policy.

When Ramsey began to write on war and peace in the late 1950s, the just-war ethic was an acknowledged but seldom used resource in the Christian church. Ramsey's work led the way for a generation of younger scholars for whom he was both a guide and a critic. In *War and Moral Discourse*, Ralph Potter made the point that many of those who disagreed with Ramsey's application of the just-war ethic to Vietnam and to the nuclear question, nonetheless owed their basic inspiration to Ramsey's work of revivifying the classical categories.

Even before *The Just War* was published, Ramsey had already opened a second front of applied research in medical ethics. From the publication of *The Patient as Person* in the mid-1960s through *Ethics at the Edges of Life* in the late 1970s, Ramsey turned out a steady stream of books and articles on questions on the beginning and end of life, experimentation, informed consent, genetics, and the care of the terminally ill. His medical ethics showed the same care for empirical evidence, sensitivity to the practitioner, and determination to protect moral principles in the face of technological change that marked Ramsey's work on war and peace.

In these two areas of applied ethics, Ramsey's writings were both foundational and controversial. To write in either field was to encounter Ramsey at the outset of one's research. To encounter Ramsey was to meet a maverick whose views often ran counter to prevailing ethical and political opinion. Ramsey staked out a position explicitly grounded in Christian terms, but hardly sectarian in the range of arguments he used to address personal and public policy issues. The power of his analysis, the willingness to engage the hard cases in any field he explored, and the sense of political realism which he brought to his writings, all gave Ramsey's work an audience beyond the Christian community.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

It would be possible to continue this intellectual biography in much greater detail, but there was more to Paul Ramsey than his writings. To know Ramsey only through the written word was to miss much of him. The writings were dense, forbidding, and filled—Richard McCormick often noted—with "purple patches." These were Ramsey's comments on other authors, sometimes humorous, often contentious.

The man was neither forbidding nor contentious. My contact began by reading Ramsey in seminary twenty-five years ago; then I met him personally through board meetings, seminars, and conferences. In these settings one encountered an approachable, engaging Christian scholar, always more interested in what others were doing than in focusing on his own work. This kind of contact was often followed by handwritten notes from Princeton. As he worked on his last book, I would get telephone calls of seminar length and depth as Ramsey checked his interpretation of a passage in the Catholic bishops' pastoral letter. Having seen the galleys of this book, I know that I disagree with some of its judgments, but I welcome it because disagreeing with Ramsey is always a learning experience.

Ramsey leaves disciples on faculties and in graduate schools around the country, a tribute to his distinguished teaching career. Some of these disciples have already made substantial contributions to applied ethics. But no disciple will quite fill the void left by Ramsey's premature passing. What he wrote, the way he wrote, and the vigor he brought to Christian moral argument make his work a landmark in this generation. We will remember him, and learn from his ideas, but we will not replace Paul Ramsey. □

OF SEVERAL MINDS John Garvey

FAMILY PHOTOGRAPHS

CONNECTING ALL THE DOTS

My wife recently brought together a number of photographs from her childhood in the Philippines, sepia prints taken only a few years after the end of World War II. One shows her in the front row of a number of children, aged four or five. She is looking very thoughtful and a little distracted. She and her brothers and sisters and cousins were assembled in rows, with her grandfather at the center, in the yard of a house which has since been torn down; the area has been turned into a sports complex. Other photos show her father gathered with his brothers and sisters and their wives and husbands. All of the men in the photograph are dead now. My wife has stories about a lot of these people, some of them funny, some tragic, some a combination of the two, like the story of an uncle who was wakened from a hangover by the sound of children singing; he beat his little nephews and nieces because they were singing "Ave Maria." They were putting on their own impromptu religious procession. He makes W.C. Fields look like Mr. Rogers. My son, looking at the pictures, comments on how formal they are.

There are photographs like this in my own family—formal, somewhat stiff-looking assemblies of people who have blood or connecting marriages in common. They are crowded photos, with parents or grandparents at the center. I wonder how many more generations will know photos like this; I wonder whether they may be relics of a period which lasted for a couple of generations after the development of photography, but points back to an older reality, one which is eroding fast. Maybe the photographs themselves are acknowledgments of how fragile and self-conscious that reality is now. Photographs of these gatherings, and family reunions, have a self-consciousness which something truly present and strong might not require. I say "might not" because it makes sense to record a good time or a rare gathering, and to gather people deliberately is a fine, celebratory instinct. But these photographs and deliberate gatherings are also attempts—good ones, necessary ones—to affirm something important, and it could be that we would not pay so much attention to them if we did not sense that something they are meant to represent is threatened.

I know it is threatened because I am part of the problem. Members of my family have tried to get together for reunions of cousins and I have begged off, because, for reasons of work or finances, I really couldn't be there; but when those gatherings involved my grandparents, dead now, I was there. Blood may be thicker than water, but it is thinner than something else (convenience? self-involvement?). My wife's family experiences a similar disconnection. We are in touch, most of us, and know generally what the family news is. But getting together is difficult, and although geographical distance is an important factor it is not the only distance. Something is happening to families and to our sense of family.

There are opposite tendencies at work in the popular images we have of what family means, the ones which show up on television, in the movies, and in fiction. There is a tendency to romanticize the family and to see in its intimacy a paradise from which we may be cast out unless we behave in just the right ways and hold just the right values. On the other hand is the tendency to see family as a specific form of hell and soul-crushing oppression from which it is only reasonable to want to escape.

Neither of these pictures is entirely false, and one hopes that most of our experiences are considerably closer to the paradisiacal model than the hellish one. However, I know people from family backgrounds so abusive that they are

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

left wounded for life, their relationships with other people permanently and negatively affected. And even people from generally happy, stable backgrounds have reasons to regret much of their family's common life. Each couple enters parenthood vowing not to make some of the same mistakes their parents made in raising them or setting them an example, and no doubt these attempts are often successful. With each new generation, a new set of mistakes is made, and children must forgive their parents. They must also be prepared to make their own set of mistakes.

This was, no doubt, always true. What is new is the extreme set of interpretations we bring to the meaning of family. It is not and cannot be a form of heaven. Most of the bond, which traditionally kept families close and made relatives people you could count on, probably was formed as a defense against a harsh social climate outside, a hedge against times of scarcity. You might be able to count on a cousin or uncle in time of need, and the corollary was that you also had to be dependable, willing to offer similar help.

This is a good, unsentimental thing. It isn't heaven. It can mean putting up with people with whom you would otherwise have nothing to do. One man whose family relationships have been very difficult told me that although he loved his father, he had come to understand that he didn't like him much at all. A network of mutual obligations ties people together in most traditional societies, and still binds many of us. But it seems to bind fewer of us together with every generation.

Some frequently cited causes are the mobility of our society and the frequency of divorce, and no doubt these do have something to do with it. However, a couple of other things ought to be noted. One is that at the economic level we do not need family bonds as we once did, though our emotional needs remain. Another and more insidious cause is that family life is, at its center, opposed to the individualism which our culture promotes. For family to work at all well, some self-sacrifice is required, and not infrequently quite a bit of it. This means not only deferred gratification, another thing our culture is no good at; sometimes the gratification isn't there at all. At the simplest level, this can involve money and its use; parents put off painting the house or forget about buying a car to help a child get through school or pay off school debts. Often it is more draining: parents cope with raising a child born with Down's syndrome, or deal with the emotional difficulty of a troubled child, or, in what is probably one of the most difficult trials of all, adult children live with and care for a parent whose mind is slowly being canceled by Alzheimer's disease.

These examples of love and self-sacrifice impress almost all of us, but they are not encouraged by a culture which stresses self-satisfaction and self-fulfillment. It could be that what we hope to celebrate in family reunions and self-conscious group photographs is the hope that we will be there for one another in difficult times, because of a connection which is more than accidental. We are, like it or not, related to and responsible for one another. This sense exists against a countervailing tide. Our culture is full of the fear that comes when there is no agreement about what we may expect from one another, what constitutes decent individual and collective behavior, what I could expect (for example) from a crowd of onlookers if I were attacked on the street or on a railway platform. We feel unprotected by a surrounding agreement, a shared moral understanding, which we sense should be there and is not. We mourn the loss of a communal understanding, the tribal sense. At the same time we do not really want any responsibility which could inconvenience us; we do not want to sacrifice the right of the self to pursue satisfaction independently. It is almost certainly true that we can't have it both ways.

The reasons we see the family mythologized as heaven or hell could be that ours is an agnostic culture. We need our heaven, as well as our hell, on this side of death. In traditional societies one puts up with a less than satisfactory life for the sake of something higher; it may be no more than the feeling that in self-sacrifice one is obeying the will of God and moving beyond the self. In our culture nothing encourages the belief that there is anything beyond the self.

I do not want to suggest that an uncritical belief in tribal and communal forms of understanding is all we really need. Some forms of family loyalty are destructive and finally unloving, and some forms of self-sacrifice are pointless and stultifying. The point is that the formality of grouped families in photographs strikes us as formal not because it is "old- fashioned"; it appears that way to us because that formality points to deep connections and networks of obligation which are not congruent with our culture. A family photograph is about something which is in fact threatened, and at its best has virtues the culture does not encourage. □

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

OCCUPYING EACH OTHER

ISRAEL & THE PALESTINIANS

MITCHELL COHEN

A scorpion once approached a frog by the banks of a river and asked to be carried across. The amphibian, knowing well the danger entailed, refused. "But think it through," coaxed the scorpion. "If I sting you, we'll both drown. It would be irrational." After due pause, the frog reconsidered. So into the waves they went. But halfway across, the scorpion stung the frog. As they both went under, the frog croaked out, "You knew that stinging me would doom us both, why did you do it?" "Because this is the Middle East," was the gurgling reply.

This long-told tale is one Israelis and Palestinians might bear in mind nowadays. From 1967 to 1987, Israel occupied the West Bank and Gaza; since the Palestinian uprising began five months ago, Israelis and Palestinians are occupying each other. It is striking, however, that what the Palestinians call the "Intifada" (the "Shaking" or "Shaking Off") has changed everything and nothing at once. The Palestinians have, for the first time, discovered effective means of resistance—rocks instead of bombs—and the relatively inexpensive costs Israel had been paying for the occupation since 1967 have escalated dramatically. At the same time, Palestinian and Israeli leaders have been pursuing, more or less, politics as usual. Thus, while moments of calm may briefly prevail again, the fury we've been witnessing is the face of the future. That is, unless a peace process begins in earnest. Unfortunately, the cards on both sides are stacked against it for now.

Israel's policy of harsh and often brutal repression of Palestinian demonstrators has been subject to much criticism. To speak of Israeli "policy," however, is to miss the point: the Israeli government is internally paralyzed and, consequently, has been using its army to enforce what can only be described as non-policy.

MITCHELL COHEN *is author of* Zion and State: Nation, Class and the Shaping of Modern Israel *(Blackwell) and associate professor of political science at the Graduate School and Baruch College of the City University of New York. He is a member of the national advisory board of "American Friends of Peace Now," a support group for the Israeli peace movement.*

On the peace issue, all Israel is divided into two parts. The inconclusive 1984 Israeli national elections pressed the country's two major blocs—fierce foes since the 1920s—into a "national unity government" on the basis of the lowest common denominator they could muster. Half the ministers—those aligned with Foreign Minister Shimon Peres's Labor party—favor an international conference as an umbrella for direct negotiations on the territorial compromise needed to achieve peace with Israel's neighbors. The other half—those aligned with Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir's rightist Likud bloc—stand adamantly opposed. Since the Likud's half can effectively block any Israeli initiative, the forces of conciliation are ensnared by the very existence of the "unity" (the word must be used advisedly here) government.

Shamir and his backers often base their territorial arguments on military grounds. A mere glance at the map and recollection of the events that led to the 1967 war demonstrate why: the West Bank and Gaza do raise the most serious questions for Israeli security. However, Shamir represents the extreme right wing of Zionism, a force which was, in fact, marginalized throughout most of Zionist history, and took center stage for the first time only with Menachem Begin's electoral victory in 1977. Irredentism has always been emblazoned on its banner, and even if security matters could be dealt with adequately, most of the Likud would still refuse to yield "Judea and Samaria." Which in effect means that Shamir has nothing to offer in negotiations.

Although Labor has both doves and hawks in its ranks, most of its leaders are now convinced that the status quo does not work to anyone's long-term advantage. Demography alone makes it self-evident that permanent occupation of the West Bank and Gaza will undermine Israel's character as a state both democratic and Jewish. Even defense minister Yitzhak Rabin, who has presided over the Israeli army's heavy-handed actions in the occupied lands, has always declared himself in favor of territorial compromise. Peres, Labor's chairman, took the initiative last year on behalf of an international peace conference, an idea recently promoted by U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz. Both Washington and Labor look primarily to Jordan or a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation as the chief nego-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tiating partner in this context. Shamir opposes it on the grounds that such a framework would enable the Arabs, with Soviet and Chinese help, to impose a disadvantageous solution on Israel. But this is disingenuous: Peres and Shultz advocate an international conference which would be an umbrella for *direct* Arab-Israeli negotiations. The U.S. can commit itself to walk out with the Israelis should things take an ominous turn in another direction. Shamir is simply opposed to the "territory for peace" formula that serious bargaining implies.

Israel must have elections by November, and current indications are that the voting will change little in the balance of political forces. Labor will try to make peace the chief issue of the campaign, but in the recent past it has been unable to set the tone of public debate. This is partly due to the nature of its leadership. Israel's founding generation—David Ben-Gurion, Levi Eshkol, Golda Meir—composed a charismatic and dynamic group of state building nationalists who, under extremely adverse circumstances, learned not only to be decisive and flexible, but how to communicate a persuasive sense of direction to their nation. Given the enormous pressures of daily life in Israel, and the substantial sacrifices required of its citizens, this is of particular political importance. With the passing of its founders, Labor Zionism's charisma became routinized; its current leaders tend to be technocrats— savvy, adaptable, but so far unable to seize on historical moments to articulate a clear and convincing message.

Today's exigency has been most vocally proclaimed by the non-parliamentary "Peace Now" movement, the foremost champions of Israeli-Palestinian compromise in the Zionist camp. Yet, while "Peace Now" has organized impressive demonstrations against government policy, it still represents a minority (though a growing one, with increasing support among American Jews).

For now, Shamir has the advantage. With both Israeli and American election campaigns on the horizon, substantial diplomatic movement will be difficult. A new American president won't be settled into office and able to promote a peace process seriously until a year from now, and much can happen in the interim. If the West Bank and Gaza remain unruly, Shamir will tell his followers to keep a stiff upper lip because the price of compromise is greater than maintaining the difficult status quo. He calculates that every act of Palestinian violence will prove his point for him, and make a Likud electoral victory more likely. All the more so if the Palestinians replace stones with bullets.



The real key to understanding Israeli behavior is fear. While Americans increasingly focus on the immediacy of the Palestinian tragedy, Israelis think historically in terms of two millennia of persecution of the Jews. For the Palestinians and their sympathizers, Israel's creation in 1948 meant the defeat of Palestinian Arab nationalism and the birth of the still festering refugee problem. For the Israelis, 1948 represents the victory of their own national liberation struggle over the enmity of the British; over the bitter hostility of and stubborn refusal to compromise by the Palestinians (whose leader, Haj Amin el-Husseini, had just spent World War II in Germany collaborating with Hitler); and over the invasion of five Arab armies under the auspices of the Arab League (whose Secretary General, Azzam Pasha, declared that there was to be "a war of extermination and momentous massacre which will be spoken of like the Mongolian massacres and the Crusades"—words resonant in Jewish ears only three years after the Holocaust).

When the Arabs cast their eyes back to 1967, they see yet another humiliating defeat at the hands of the Zionists, the beginning of two decades of occupation, and the threat of dispossession. For Israelis, 1967 represents a war forced on them by Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, and an ensuing occupation they hadn't asked for in the first place. Israel, in 1967, declared its willingness to trade territories for peace, and the Khartoum Summit Conference of the Arab League responded with its famous "three noes"—no peace, no recognition, no negotiations.

So the rub is this: while the Jewish state has the strongest military force in the region, no amount of Israeli power will allay Israeli fears that they might wind up again as they did in May 1967, surrounded, threatened, isolated...and then blamed for doing something about it. Anwar Sadat grasped this. Sadat's dramatic journey to Jerusalem and his unambiguous recognition of Israel's right to exist breached the psychological barriers. Consequently, most Israelis shed their previous opposition to the return of all Sinai to Egypt.

A similar initiative is not in the offing from today's Palestinian leadership, something which suits Israeli rightists just fine. The PLO joined Shamir in rejecting the Shultz initiative. When "Peace Now" calls on the Israeli government to be forthcoming on the Palestinian question, the premier and his allies have a stock reply: "Where is the Palestinian 'Peace Now'?" And here, unfortunately, they have a point. Most Palestinians who have championed compromise either have been silenced by the bullets of Palestinian extremists, or found themselves with a small audience, if any audience at all.

A population has now emerged in the West Bank and Gaza

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

willing to challenge the Israelis as never before. The uprising is, in the final analysis, the result of people seeing few, if any, acceptable future options. For those living in the refugee camps, some 22.5 percent of West Bank and Gaza Arabs, there wasn't much to lose; the fact that the Arab states and the PLO have, for their own political purposes, long opposed dismantling the camps has little immediate relevance. The youngsters throwing rocks at Israeli troops have known nothing but Israeli occupation. The living conditions in the camps are a true horror and, according to Meron Benvenisti, the former deputy mayor of Jerusalem who heads a project studying the occupied territories, Israelis or the Israeli government now control some 52 percent of West Bank and Gaza land. In short, what Israel is faced with is the indigenous rebellion of an occupied people, not the handiwork of a few outside agitators; the latter were hardly needed to kindle discontent after twenty years of foreign dominance.

But if everything seems to have changed for Palestinians under occupation, little seems to have changed for the PLO. Not having initiated the revolt, it remains unable to take an intelligent initiative. The PLO has had a golden opportunity to reveal to the world—and to the Israelis—whether or not compromise is truly on its agenda. The obvious step was to call an urgent meeting of the PNC (the Palestinian National Council—its "parliament-in-exile") to launch a real peace effort. Instead, the PLO has pulled old tricks out of its hat: a public relations stunt (trying to send a ship of Palestinians to Israel in a reenactment of the 1947 Exodus episode); murder (it hijacked and slaughtered civilians on a bus in the Negev); and Yasir Arafat granted one of his now famous interviews with a Western journalist, in this case Anthony Lewis of the *New York Times*.

What Israelis see is this: words aimed at Westerners, bullets at Israelis, and then amazement and condemnation when Israel declines to take seriously PLO claims of moderation. The problem goes even deeper. When Arafat speaks to his own constituents, his words are rather less soothing than those he has for European and American journalists. To the latter he talks of a "democratic secular Palestine in which Jews, Moslems, and Christians can live together" or of a West Bank-Gaza state as solutions to the problem. But in his speech to the important PNC meeting last year in Algiers, Arafat declared that "this Palestinian land will remain Arab, Arab," that he was marching on "the road of Jihad" (holy war), that "the Palestinian rifle shall not be laid down until we reach Palestine, all Palestine." Should Israelis believe the PLO chief when he addresses his own constituents or when he speaks to Western journalists? For Israelis, it is obvious that an Arafat desirous of compromise would have long ago discarded such language, which is still pretty much a staple of PLO discourse.

What ought Arafat to do? He ought to address a consistent message of moderation to his *own* constituents and, *just as importantly*, directly and forthrightly to the Israeli people—not to the *New York Times* which, after all, is not party to the conflict.

But this is precisely what Arafat doesn't do. Why? Partly because of the lineup of forces within the PLO as a whole, and in his own Al Fatah, the dominant PLO group, in particular. The Algiers PNC meeting dramatically reunified Arafat with more extreme "rejectionist" elements, like George Habash's Damascus-based Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, under the PLO umbrella after years of dispute. If Arafat were actually inclined to move towards the Israelis in a significant way, he would have to chance wrecking this delicately reconstructed unity and risk undermining his own base. It is a high price to pay and it is not at all certain that Arafat could sustain the support of his own Al Fatah colleagues. As in the past, he is most likely to choose his organizational imperatives over the possibility of diplomatic breakthrough.

Hence the ironic symmetry in today's situation: the politics of national unity have precluded political initiative on both the Palestinian and the Israeli sides.

What of the attitudes of the Palestinians in the territories? If Israeli behavior is rooted in fear, that of West Bank and Gaza Palestinians is rooted in angry resentments. In late January, I had a long conversation with a Palestinian friend, a political scientist with good access to the PLO, who had just returned from several weeks in Jerusalem, in the midst of the unrest. His sense was that, in Gaza, "Jihad" (the Moslem Fundamentalists) was now equal in backing to Fatah, though this support was somewhat soft. In the West Bank, Fatah was still strongest but both Jihad and Habash's radical PFLP were gaining substantial ground. Hanna Siniora—the moderate East Jerusalem editor who was once deemed acceptable by both the Israeli government and the PLO as a Palestinian representative in negotiations—had "no constituency whatsoever."

These impressions are largely consistent with a recent study of West Bank and Gaza political attitudes conducted in the summer of 1986 (*The Middle East Journal*, Winter, 1988). In it, 26.5 percent of the respondents advocated a political system based on the *Sharia* (Moslem Law) in a future Palestinian state, and 29.6 percent declared in favor of a state "based on Arab nationalism and Islam" (2.1 percent favored a state based solely on Arab nationalism). The option of a "democratic secular state" received a mere 10.4 percent backing and a "democratic-Palestinian state" got 21.1 percent. What "democratic" means here is ambiguous since Western democratic systems received but 1.9 percent support and Soviet-style systems 6.7 percent. At the same time—and in apparent contradiction to the previous statistics—when asked their preferred solution to the conflict, 77.9 percent said "a democratic Palestinian state in all of Palestine," as against a mere 1 percent in favor of linking the West Bank and Gaza to Jordan.

A total of 16.9 percent accepted an independent West Bank-Gaza state as a solution to the conflict, although 49.7 percent accepted it as an interim solution. On the other hand, 43.2 percent rejected such an interim in favor of continued struggle for a Palestinian state in *all* Palestine. Only 8.3 percent felt diplomacy was to be the preferred means of pur-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

suing Palestinian goals; 20.7 percent justified placing bombs on civilian airliners (60.5 percent if it was an El Al plane). Over a third, 36.9 percent, justified the massacres at the Rome and Vienna airports in December 1985.

In short, Palestinian public opinion is hardly inclined towards the types of concessions peace with Israel requires; quite to the contrary. Add to this Arafat's unwillingness and/or inability to push his own organization and constituents decisively in new directions, and it seems probable that a real opportunity for easing the Palestinian plight will (once again!) be lost. The PLO has long been expert at such squandering precisely because when it speaks the language of peace, it generally does so with so much ambiguity that it loses credibility; or else it addresses itself to everyone save those with whom it must compromise—the Israelis. Ironically, it may end up that the best friends the Palestinians have is the Israeli peace movement.

A sober analysis of the present situation—one that puts aside the furies of the moment for an understanding of the actual constellation of forces—reveals little place for optimism. And the recent events have again highlighted a factor long at the heart of the conflict: each side sees the other as The Other, a menacing foe whose identity and rights can never be acknowledged lest the way down a slippery slope to self-destruction be opened. Except for a surprise turn of events, Israelis and Palestinians will, for the foreseeable future, continue to occupy and preoccupy each other, unhappy frogs and scorpions in a Middle Eastern caldron. □

TO INSTRUCT THE IGNORANT

WORKS OF MERCY IN A PSYCHOLOGICAL AGE

SIDNEY CALLAHAN

What is ignorance? And what does it have to do with us? Why should we go about correcting it? The essence of ignorance seems to be a failing to notice, and then failing to notice that we fail to notice. The worst thing about ignorance is that one can remain smugly, blissfully unaware of it. If you already know that you don't know, if you are aware of your own ignorance, you have made the first great leap toward knowledge. Unfortunately, unless another person cares enough to instruct you, you can remain blind, dumb, and ignorant until you die.

Why are we so ignorant and easily deceived about ourselves? Why don't we achieve self-knowledge more promptly? Although philosophers and mystics have always said that spiritual progress requires self-knowledge, the task remains incredibly difficult. We look around us and see such widespread blindness to self—and, of course, we have had enough painful personal experiences of entrapment in illusion and ignorance of self to recognize the condition. Intense new interest in this ancient human problem has produced a provocative new psychology of self-deception.

SIDNEY CALLAHAN *is associate professor of psychology at Mercy College, Dobbs Ferry, and the author of several books, including* The Illusion of Eve *and* Parenting. *This article is excerpted from her* With All My Heart and Mind *to be published this spring by The Crossroad Publishing Company.* *© 1988 by Sidney Callahan. Reprinted by permission of the publisher and author.*

According to some new theories, self-deception is genetically programmed into the human species. Some measure of self-deception has adaptive uses that favor its continued use in the struggle for human survival. Persons who can successfully fool themselves may look more sincere to others, seem more sincere to themselves, and so be able to garner more of the environment's resources: they can rationalize their selfish strategies and provide advantages to their own offspring, who perpetuate the genes. Evolutionary theorists are just as sure that altruism, cooperation, and learning are also innate, so one finds a curious secular replay of original-sin theories in which human nature is mostly good, but also wounded in its propensity for self-enhancing illusions.

Other investigations of self-deception do not focus on evolutionary strategies but upon the way human consciousness functions day to day. A built-in need for self-deception is posited as emerging from the strong human drive to avoid pain and seek pleasure. Avoiding pain by not attending to it may be both an innate and learned defensive strategy. There may be physical and psychological trade-offs and adjustments between pain and attention. If I don't notice something, it hurts less; it is easier to avoid a painful reality than to try to change it. The self's negative experiences of weakness, failure, and wrongdoing may be particularly painful to confront with full awareness. Ergo, a defensive dimming of attention or outright avoidance becomes the best defense.

Self-scrutiny and introspection have traditionally been known as painful and difficult enterprises. Research studies of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

attention and self-consciousness have confirmed the fact that when we become self-conscious we usually become self-critical. Our attention is turned inward upon our weaknesses and inadequacies, and we notice our failures to meet our own standards. Pain and the threat to our self-esteem tempt us defensively to change or distort reality in order to be able to protect ourselves from the truth. We can learn to keep our attention dimmed or turned outward in habitual defensive strategies that prevent self-knowledge.

Habitual self-deception is possible because humans have multiple, complex, different levels of functioning and consciousness. Highly differentiated semi-independent systems are an advantage when it comes to self-correction; one system can check, substitute for, or correct the input of another. But it is also possible for systems to become isolated or fail to be integrated properly. We usually function with several simultaneously interacting systems—with a physiological system, an emotional-affective interpersonal system, and a conscious-rational symbolic system. Each system contributes to a sense of self or identity. The most familiar self that we recognize is the alert, awake consciousness or "I" that seems to scan the world without and within like a narrow beam of light. When we daydream or go to sleep we can feel this beam fading and other levels of functioning taking over. When awake we direct our beam of attentive consciousness toward reality, ready to cope with daily life.

But when our coping is not successful or when we are frustrated, we can see defensive maneuvers taking place in consciousness and attention. Our dedication to reality wavers, particularly if self-scrutiny is in order. We resist turning the light inward upon ourselves because of the discomfort and critical function of self-consciousness. The habitual defensive strategies can begin. Because we are so complicated it seems possible that information can be processed but remain isolated from full conscious awareness. We become adept at hiding from full self-confrontation, in order to avoid pain, procure pleasure, or block the moral self-censure of guilt or shame. The more maladaptive the process becomes and the more we hide from self-knowledge, the more threatened and defensive we become.

All psychological therapies or programs for self-knowledge or spiritual disciplines insist upon directing consciousness inward in searching self-observation. This mindfulness or sustained attention to inner reality is a painful but necessary discipline for personal change and progress. The natural tendency toward self-deception and defense has to be struggled against by equally strong efforts toward reality and truthful self-confrontation. When a person's automatic, heretofore avoided or isolated defensive processes are attended to and brought to full consciousness, a person can be free to choose in new ways what will determine his or her future life. We are told to know ourselves so that we can be freed from being driven by hidden forces with which we have colluded in self-protective strategies of self-deception.



Naturally we resist the pain and the effort to overcome ignorance of the self, even while desiring to be free.

We both seek and resist enlightenment, but without the help of other persons we can never overcome self-deception. None of us can experience ourselves or see ourselves as others do. We cannot see how we look from the back, or be fully conscious of all our unconscious habits and mannerisms, nor can we penetrate our personality all by ourselves. Others must disclose us to ourselves by their response to us. One can overcome ignorance of the self by the ongoing dialogue with the other. If we are failing to communicate, if we are arrogant or too self-deprecating, someone must tell us; are we reading the environment and other persons rationally?

We instruct one another by giving accurate responses and reactions to what is said and done. If we love persons we are forced in charity to tell them truthfully how we respond to them. Without this truthful response a person can continue in defensive, self-deceptive traps. Often those who have been raised by too indulgent parents, or those in positions of great power who are surrounded by sycophants, or those who are greatly pitied or avoided, will not have the truth told to them. They do not get a proper education in self-knowledge because the human dialogue has been deficient or dishonest. Sooner or later they pay for the fact that others did not love them enough to tell them what they needed to know or to force them to confront the real consequences of what they do.

To instruct another in the struggle for self-knowledge is much like all instructing, a delicate task filled with paradox. One must tell the other when that person is failing, while supporting and affirming him or her. It is no favor to mislead

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

AFTER THE NEWS
SHAPE YOUR VIEWS

FRED SIEGEL • on Bitburg, '88—a
scholar of political
[illegible] on both
[illegible]

PETER KOVLER • on [illegible]'s
[illegible]

ABIGAIL [illegible] • on [illegible]

DAVID [illegible] • on [illegible]'s
[illegible]

NANCY [illegible] • on [illegible] federal
[illegible]

ELIOT [illegible] • on [illegible] Street's
[illegible]

. . . All from recent issues.

COMMONWEAL

15 Dutch St., New York, N.Y. 10038

Trial subscription offer: 11 issues for $9

Name _____

Address _____

City, State, Zip _____

☐ **I prefer a full year's subscription at $28.** 4/22/88

another out of mistaken efforts at nurturing. In this culture women have often been socialized to soothe, charm, lie, and cover up the faults of the men and children in their lives. Through timidity, mistaken kindness, or inattentiveness, many persons do not get in family life the instruction in self-discipline they need. The situation is far worse if a family is at the same time too ungenerous or meanspirited to affirm an individual's good qualities and potential strengths.

In many cases it takes psychological counseling to liberate and free the self from distorted past learning which no longer applies in the present. As in other instruction, the goal is to induce self-control and ongoing self-guidance. It is possible to learn to think about one's thinking and regularly examine how one feels and functions with other people. The more self-knowledge and self-awareness, the more freedom of choice. It is possible to learn to feel and act in new ways. Action, thought, and feeling can change if we make enough effort and have enough good and truthful companions to help us overcome our ignorance of ourselves. Self-control, or self-mastery, basically seems to be an ability to integrate consciously all of our different systems and levels of personality so that we can choose to act as we would.

Many of us who were educated in an earlier day were taught strategies of self-control in the family. Self-discipline was part of the Calvinist American heritage that fused stoic values and good manners. One was taught to cultivate cheerfulness and self-control as a contribution to the family and social circle; one should never be so self-indulgent or so rude as to litter the communal space with surliness or bad feeling.

Ironically, psychological research has now vindicated the therapeutic value of many of the personal self-management strategies that parents and schools once taught. Stop pouting, don't dwell on your troubles, get busy, and you will feel better. Stand up straight, dress up, clean your room, and you will feel better. Go talk to others and you'll stop feeling self-conscious. Learn patience, finish what you start, and you'll feel better. Do something for others, be cheerful, and you'll feel better. Such strategies worked and still work; we can make ourselves feel better and change ourselves for the better through strategic efforts at self-control. What psychology calls self-management or self-control training, we called "character," the traits which you built through persistent effort.

Character means that individuals shape their environment, including their inner environment, as much as the environment shapes them. There is two-way influence. Freely willed effort can produce transformations of the unconscious and preconscious as well. Through effort, love, attention, and discipline those parts of the personality that seem beyond direction, awareness, and control can slowly be changed. Through consciousness and effort we can change much of our preconscious and emotional life. The method seems to be to deploy attention, the capacity which gives us freedom and makes self-management possible. Those parents, teachers, therapists, or

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

religious guides who instruct us to know ourselves, and direct ourselves, and achieve disciplined self-control prepare us to be able to cope with life—and to be cheerful while doing so.

Many young people in our post-Calvinist culture do not seem prepared to struggle with difficulties. They have been so protected by loving parents and shielded by affluence that they are not ready for the tests of character and personal integration which life brings. The need for self-discipline, perseverance, and long-term effort is a surprise to them. That marriage takes sacrifice is a surprise; that one's work and career should take so much dedication and effort is easier to understand, but still something of a shock. The difficulty of balancing work and family becomes disconcerting if not overwhelming. And few are prepared for the struggles of parenthood in a time when much of the family and community support for child rearing has vanished. Today we see many young adults struggling to come to terms with adulthood, sadly ignorant of many psychological and spiritual truths that could help them.

To instruct another is to collaborate with God, the One who teaches and enlightens. There will be effort, pain, and joy in this spiritual work of mercy, but love impels us to seek truth and share what we have with others. Our God, who came to teach us personally and who instructs us from within, enkindles the fire to know and to teach in all hearts. We imitate the most loving, patient, and attentive of all teachers when we instruct the ignorant. □

THE RETURN TO POPULISM

DEMOCRATS TRY HARDER . . . AGAIN

FRED SIEGEL

Populism runs through America's political bloodstream: Nothing mobilizes American passions, left and right, faster than the sense that an establishment—the figurative heirs of King George—is conspiring against the common folk. But the populists have never been able to capture the national body politic: Neither the nineteenth-century populists, nor their legatees in the twentieth, such as George Wallace, have ever been able to take power. Nonetheless, populists have had, at certain moments, a profound impact on the nation's political agenda.

In 1988, populism has been a tonic for the Democrats' campaign. For twenty years they have wandered in the political wilderness with a culturally defined agenda, focused on issues like abortion, no-growth economics, busing, and capital punishment. The party has come close to defining itself by its opposition to the fears and aspirations of ordinary citizens. Its economic message, admirable as it was in its concern for the desperately poor, took on a distinctly paternalistic tone that alienated wage-earners struggling with inflation and rapidly escalating taxes. By contrast, the emphasis in this election on economic populism allows the Democrats to jump into the trenches on the same side as their constituents' prejudices and real needs.

One by one, led by Jesse Jackson, the Democratic presidential candidates have embraced what southerners like to call "little man economics." Some of the candidates wear the populist mantle more easily than others, but it is surely a sign of the times when a buttoned-down candidate like Michael Dukakis takes, as he did in Illinois, to wearing hard hats and affecting working-class poses. Jackson's Iowa campaign has been given credit for forcing the other candidates to focus on the gut-wrenching costs of the internationalization of the American economy. But the Democrats' return to populist themes began before Jackson adopted his current political persona and it has far broader roots.

Populist rhetoric surfaced sporadically during the 1982 elections held in the midst of a severe recession. But populist themes never moved center stage and they played no part in Walter Mondale's staid 1984 presidential effort. One of the few bright spots of 1984 was the victory of Iowa Democrat Tom Harkin in unseating an incumbent Republican senator. Harkin, a self-styled populist, set the keynote for what was to follow when he told his fellow Democrats that they had been "missing the boat." "We have been lacking," he said, "the courage to respond on really economic populist grounds. It's like we forgot what our roots are as Democrats."

The opening for the Democrats to return, at least in part, to these economic roots was made possible by the Republican failure to escape theirs as the party of big business. Innovative Republicans like Congressmen Newt Gingrich, Jack Kemp, and Trent Lott spoke of a Conservative Opportunity Society in which the Republican party, freed of its ties with big business, would represent the promise of mobility for all. Their hope for a free-market populism, critical of both big government and

FRED SIEGEL, *author of* Troubled Journey: From Pearl Harbor to Ronald Reagan *(Hill and Wang), teaches in the humanities department of The Cooper Union in New York City. He is writing regularly for* Commonweal *on the presidential election.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

big business, failed the test of practical politics. In the manner of the Oscar Wilde character who could resist anything but temptation, Republican officeholders managed with great success to front for big business's subsidies behind rhetorical flourishes extolling the majestic impartiality of the free market. It's not surprising then that pollster Stanley Greenberg reported in 1986 that "the principal obstacles blocking the move of voters from Democratic to Republican was the feeling that the GOP was in bed with big institutions and big corporations." Voters, after all, have almost as much fear of giant private bureaucracies as they do of the one in Washington.

And then there is President Reagan's contribution to the Democrats' new opportunity. His inability to bring in large numbers of new officeholders on his coattails in the 1984 election, and his unwillingness to expend his enormous personal popularity on behalf of specific Republican policy proposals, gave the tender shoots of populism some room to grow. But even more important than Reagan's failures were his successes. In addition, the administration's victory over inflation had the ironic effect of restoring confidence in government. The result has been a steady rise of public belief in the government's problem-solving abilities. That confidence plus the backlog of serious social and economic problems produced a turning point in 1985. Congress increasingly refused to cut domestic social programs and by 1986, it was rejecting a higher percentage of administration legislation than at any time since the waning months of Jerry Ford's presidency.

The first electoral sign of a shift of the political winds within the Democratic party came in the 1986 primaries when self-described populists captured the primaries in Wisconsin, Georgia, New York, and Pennsylvania. The flag-bearers of the new spirit were farm state populists like the newly elected senator from North Dakota, Kent Conrad, and Texas agricultural commissioner, Jim Hightower. Hightower, who has endorsed Jesse Jackson for president, mocked the party's neo-liberals. Moderation, said Hightower, was a dead end, "because there's nothing in the middle of the road but yellow stripes and dead armadillos."

The economic messages the Democratic candidates rehearsed in '86 have become the prime-time themes of the '88 presidential primaries. Democrats had long warned of racial divisions, but the '86 message, played out against the backdrop of declining middle-class income and the loss of manufacturing jobs, was increasingly of economic and regional divisions. While the East and West Coasts and their financial markets were booming and the executive class was getting to play out the fantasies of the "Life-styles of the Rich and Famous," the heartland was suffering. It is one of the great ironies of this administration that the policies of the heartland's hero, Ronald Reagan, have had a devastating effect on his core supporters, while his cultural foes, the Eastern establishment, have been thriving.

In the 1970s, environmentalists and the proponents of a no-growth economy wanted to phase out industrial society. American financiers and manufacturers have been delivering on that wish. The primary producers in mining, timber, energy, and particularly farming have been caught in a vicious double squeeze. The great pride of the Reagan administration is its success in stifling inflation. But the costs of that achievement have been borne disproportionately by farmers dependent on the flow of cheap credit. At the same time as Paul Volker's actions at the Federal Reserve were vastly increasing the farmers' costs, the Fed and the financial community were cutting off one of the farm states' primary markets, Latin America. The political upshot of this is that the same kind of deflationary pressures which often accompany a Republican administration (the 1920s and 1950s, for example) has produced in parts of the country today the kind of economic pressures associated with the populist rebellions of the nineteenth century.

The disparity between the wild excesses of corporate "compensation" for the executives of waning companies, like General Motors, and the human cost of America's declining position in world markets has produced a backlash. Recent Harris polls record a sharp rise in public resentment of corporate America. In the face of declining real wages, America's failure to compete in the world market is increasingly laid at the doorstep of management. "The multinationals," stresses candidate Jackson—sounding for all the world like Richard Gephardt—"fly above the flag. They don't see red, white, and blue. They see green, green, green." And Richard Darman, a frustrated populist who left the Reagan administration, says, "Big government isn't what is bugging everyone these days. It's the fat cat managers with their golden parachutes, the 'bloated risk-averse' 'corpocracy' which is stirring anger."

Neo-populism bore its first presidential fruits for the Democrats on March 8 with Super-Tuesday's southern primaries. There was a widespread fear among Democrats that, faced with what hopeful Republicans described as a choice between participating in "the liberal or in the conservative primary," large numbers of white southern Democrats would opt to vote in the conservative Republican contests. Though there was a marked growth in the number of southerners voting in the Republican primaries, the crossover vote never materialized. The pattern is uneven, but through most of the South the crossover vote was kept below 10 percent while white turnout increased. More generally the Democrats benefited from the message of economic growth broadcast by all the candidates. This is a theme that plays well in the South which still thinks of itself as a developing region and where the Democrats' no-growth economics of the 1970s played poorly with both blacks and whites.

If any candidate has paid a price for taking populist positions it is Dick Gephardt. The Missourian's economic nationalism was lambasted in editorials on the pages of the *New York Times*, the *Washington Post*, the *Wall Street Journal*, and countless other newspapers. A survey of network news shows indicates that Gephardt's economic views gar-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

nered him far and away the most negative television coverage of any of the Democratic contenders. Gephardt seemed surprised by the near universal hostility he unleashed in the press. Perhaps, as political analyst Jim Chapin has suggested, Gephardt thought his patent insincerity would save him.

Gephardt's populist message didn't fail. Gephardt, for lack of money, failed to get his candidacy associated with the winning ideas. The *Wall Street Journal* poll of likely Super-Tuesday primary voters found that 71 percent were more likely, only 15 percent were less likely, to vote for a candidate "who says the United States must get tough with its foreign trading partners." In a state like Michigan where the voters were familiar with all the candidates, Governor Dukakis's free-trade position cost him dearly. Despite the support of many party notables, Dukakis failed to garner substantial blue-collar support and ran a distant second to Jesse Jackson.

The Gephardt candidacy was ended by the congressman's third-place finish in Michigan. But the trade issue is, in one form or another, likely to provide a focal point for populist resentment. The cheap dollar, which so far has done little to improve the trade deficit, has allowed foreign interests to come in and buy up American businesses at a rate that is alarming even to Wall Street giants like Felix Rohatyn. Gephardt's harshest critic, Dukakis, has, like the Reagan administration, emphasized the retail or lawyerly case-by-case approach to trade issues. But increasingly even the devoted free traders of the Reagan administration complain of being "nickled and dimed" by the Japanese. No sooner is one trade dispute with the Japanese settled after extensive negotiations, than another breaks out. Frustrated Reaganites like Clyde Preskowitz have called for moving beyond the simplicities of free-market rhetoric. Like Gephardt, Preskowitz wants to deal with Japanese neo-mercantilism, not case by case, but by frankly "managing" the overall Japanese-American trade relationship. Critics of the retail approach note that the threat posed by Gephardt's Iowa commercials attacking Korean auto prices led not to endless negotiations but to an immediate 20 percent drop in Korea's high import duties.

The political analysts' favorite analog for the 1988 race is the 1960 election when, after an era of conservative government, the country "wanted to get moving again." But while in 1960 the Democrats had no organized left wing, today the Reverend Jesse Jackson has given them one. Jackson's talk of "economic violence" and corporate "barracudas" has helped set the tone of the campaign. Jackson has dropped most of the black nationalist third worldism that led him to praise Castro's "moral leadership" and describe the Cuban dictator's Isle of Youth indoctrination center as "one of the most magnificent expressions of God in the world today." Instead, he has pursued a frankly class-based, biracial economic appeal. And to judge by the television coverage of the very favorable responses Jackson has gotten when speaking to white workers and farmers, one might get the impression that Jackson has also won a substantial share of their vote. But with the instructive exception of Wisconsin that hasn't happened.

Jackson has done far better among whites than he did in 1984. In Alabama, he jumped from 1 to 6 percent of the white vote, and in Florida he went from 1 to 7 percent, which was roughly his share of the overall southern white vote. But there is less here than meets the eye, particularly if we remember that Democratic primary voters are the most liberal section of the population. A Roper survey taken before Super-Tuesday asked voters how they would respond to a hypothetical election in which the only thing known about a candidate was his race. Eight percent of the white voters said that with this information alone they would prefer the black candidate. If we look at Jackson's 8 percent, we find that, rather than being the horny-handed sons of toil, they were the same kind of up-scale professional voters who were at the heart of the losing McGovern campaign.

Jackson has, in short, brought his black base into an electoral alliance with the party's left wing. By galvanizing the left with his hard-hitting message, Jackson has done best in caucus states like Alaska where he won and he has done very well with upper-income white voters in New England. In Connecticut, for instance, two-fifths of his white supporters had done post-graduate work. Jackson's victory in Michigan is put in some perspective when we remember that the reason Michigan has a caucus is that the last time the state had a primary—in 1972—the winner was George Wallace. Wallace's 800,000 votes out of 1.6 million cast were more than twice as many as the second-place finisher, George McGovern. Jackson's triumph, by contrast, where he beat Dukakis two to one, involved 200,000, or one-eighth as many participants.

In Wisconsin, a state with a long populist tradition, which includes the LaFollettes on the left and Joe McCarthy on the right, Jackson succeeded for the first time in drawing in a significant number of blue-collar workers, some of whom had been Wallace supporters. But even in Wisconsin, Jackson drew a larger percentage of supporters from those who had done post-graduate work than from those without any degree at all. For Michael Dukakis, however, the winner of the Wisconsin primary by a twenty-point margin, the numbers were revealingly reversed. For the first time the defiantly low-key

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

governor did better with those who had the least education. Did Dukakis suddenly generate mass appeal? Probably not. What the press has been reluctant to note is that Jackson's courting of Wisconsin—he campaigned there off and on for five years—also produced an enormous anti-Jackson vote. Jackson's total of 285,000 votes was actually a few thousand *more* than Gary Hart secured, winning in 1984. The difference was that nearly 400,000 more voters came out in '88. Most of these went to Dukakis, a hitherto uninspiring candiate, whose chief asset appears to have been the fact that he was the candidate best positioned to defeat Jackson.

The Wisconsin outcome suggests the limits of Jackson's success. Different polls indicate that anywhere between one-third and one-half of all registered voters have a strongly negative response to Jackson. For many of these voters Jackson has not yet lived down his past and nothing short of a photograph of his future intentions is likely to reassure them.

Jackson's appeal is limited by racist sentiments. One-third of those hostile to him in a *Time* magazine poll admitted as much, and we can assume that the real total is higher. But race alone isn't holding Jackson back. Two black candidates, Douglas Wilder in Virginia and Tom Bradley in California, polled 46 and 44 percent of the white vote respectively running statewide. In Illinois, where Jackson won only 7 percent of the white vote, with most of it coming from the highly mobilized gay community, white voters gave far greater support to the black state comptroller and Chicago's black city treasurer.

Jackson, like the failed populists of the Republican party, is held back by the ambiguous nature of his anti-establishment appeal. Republicans have tried to be anti-establishment by criticizing Washington while going light on their big business allies. Jackson is tough on the corporate bureaucrats, but positively applauds the Washington variety when they impose their racial blueprints on schools and hiring. In this game of alternating antipathies, each side tries to mobilize the population's resentments against the other's vested interests.

In the end, the Democratic party's populism, genuine or not, is limited by the very programs the Democrats have put in place since 1929. Imagine, for instance, how much more painful the restructuring of the economy would have been if there weren't a Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation to protect the unlucky people who put their savings in one of the many Texas banks that has gone belly-up. And what the suffering of the family farmers would be like without federal price supports. And look at Wall Street: In the wake of the October 19 stock market crash, the arch-capitalist *Wall Street Journal*, without a hint of irony, was able to assure its readers that the Keynesian interventions of the federal government—something the *Journal* has opposed for fifty years—would be there to save the economy.

It is one of the paradoxes of the welfare state that the American public has to be protected from the vagaries of the international economy, which has been created in the name of the free market, with the un-American device of government bureaucracies, which so arouse, but in the end soften, the public's ire. □

SCREEN

TWO SNORTS
'MILAGRO' & 'CHANNELS'

The Milagro Beanfield War marks Robert Redford's return to directing; it is his first film since the far superior *Ordinary People* (1981). Hopes were high for *Milagro*, because he has backed a number of small, quality independent films (*El Norte, Desert Bloom*) through his Sundance Film Institute in Colorado. Like Jessica Lange and Sissy Spacek, Redford has used his name and money to improve the movie-making system. He has also dedicated time and energy to supporting the ecology movement, a concern that forms the backbone of *Milagro*. The result? A nice liberal movie.

Milagro depicts the efforts of a group of Hispanic New Mexicans to resist large scale condo-cum-golf course development of their ancestral valley. To cast an ethnic group as heroes (led by Brazilian actress Sonia Braga and Puerto Rican actor/director Rueben Blades) still requires some courage, even with the growing number of mainstream movies directed to Hispanic audiences (*La Bamba*) or Hispanic problems (the new anti-SAT school film *Stand and Deliver*).

Redford also turns from Hollywood formulas by making the hero the community of Milagro, and not the owner of the beanfield (Chick Vennera), who begins a protest by diverting water from an irrigation canal feeding the development project. Indeed, the cast includes familiar faces, but no superstar diverts attention from the group. And many non-actors appear as the townspeople of Milagro. Redford celebrates community by shaping his medium to his message. Although Braga dominates many scenes with one of the simplest but most alluring costumes in recent movies, Redford educes some good ensemble acting.

But Redford's diffuse focus could only work if the rest of the film were emotionally coherent. He has weakened the screenplay with unexpected whimsy, mock-heroic jesting, cartoon satire of the bad guys, and stabs at light surrealism (the ghost of Vennera's father drops by to chat with the village ancient, played by the veteran Mexican actor Carlos Riquelme).

Too many happy endings leave *Milagro* without focus and without bite. Redford may have been trying for a fantastic tale à la Marquez, but *Milagro* winds up merely mawkish. Why care for characters in a film whose style so frequently telegraphs that they have, really, nothing to worry about? The weak may inherit the earth, but never so cloyingly.

Take *Milagro*'s pig, for example. At first, it is a naughty, snorty variant on the lovable pet. This giant porker roves around town, sometimes looking for affection, sometimes looking for trouble. Señor Pig adds spunk and local flavor. But it reappears twice too often—once for the inevitable shooting

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and once for an improbable cure.

Milagro declares that not caring is passé. One scene announces Redford's intent. Veteran actor John Heard plays an activist lawyer, burned out by too many lost cases. Enlisted by Braga to defend Vennera, he screams at her, "Don't you know the sixties are over." But he agrees to take the case. And surprise! Commitment brings renewal of his values and faith in justice.

The problem? Such values are not movingly, deeply, or richly portrayed. Other recent, well-intentioned political films (*Cry Freedom, End of the Line, Walker*), have the same problem. Of course, they are preferable to *Rambo* clones and assembly-line thrillers (*Little Nikita, Off Limits, D.O.A.*). The sentimental liberalism, the wishful thinking, and propagandistic superficiality of these films make one fear, alas, that the worst aspects of the sixties aren't dead. Just what do you think brought us the backlash kids, Nixon and Reagan? *Pace* Redford, it's not enough to care; it helps to think. Or perhaps to care enough to think.

A Xerox machine stands as the perfect symbol for *Switching Channels*, replacing the roll-up desk as the key stage device of *His Girl Friday*, Howard Hawks's 1940 comic gem with Cary Grant, Rosalind Russell, and Ralph Bellamy. In this remake, Burt Reynolds, Kathleen Turner, and Christopher Reeve redo the roles—as a news editor, his ex-wife and reporter, and a businessman trying to lure the lady away. Like colorization, such a remake brings on nostalgia for the original.

The problem isn't derivativeness. *His Girl Friday* itself was based on the MacArthur-Hecht stage classic, *Front Page*, also made into a film (with a Lemmon-Matthau team-up) in 1960. The play, too, is so often restaged that it is hard to fault the producers of *Switching Channels* for trying to cash in on the cockamamy plot. But what have they given us that's new? Superficial contemporaneity and hi-tech. The title tells all: what's new here is "broadcast news." The Xerox fits like a clone.

The acting adds little. Yuppie jokes are aimed at Reeve, but he flattens them by personifying too aptly the banality of his character. Reynolds evokes our memory of Cary Grant only to his own discredit. Bulging eyes and awkward arm-waving gestures can't replace the antic grace, zest for mischief, and the rapid-fire Cockney mouth ("Hildy, Hildy, Hildy," he would plead with sweet mock-reason to Rosalind Russell) that fired Grant at his best. Turner plays her role well, but is perhaps too warm and wide a face—or too mellow an actress—to convince us she is a feisty go-getter.

The basic change involves the actors less than acting styles and writing. Those who lament our lost literacy can cite the example of such remakes not just for poor language but for verbal sloth. The new screenplay doesn't have the MacArthur-Hecht-Hawks's snap and crackle, nor do the actors have sufficient skill in repartee to raise the whole to zany anarchy. The laughs aren't there.

The film has one plus, its cartoon image of the media. Given the press's control of real discussion about the press, anything that breeds skepticism of the self-appointed arbiters of our national life deserves attention. Here, TV newsmen run around rudely, mindlessly, while the few remaining print reporters are corrupt fools despite their pretensions to greater integrity.

Channels, like *Broadcast News*, is limited. *News* implies that the faults of TV journalism derive from limited air time and too-handsome anchors (as if twenty-four-hour CNN-type news stations with dour-faced grumps assure "quality"!). In *Channels*, Turner saves a man wrongly condemned to death. Both films satirize the press, but celebrate its public role.

The ancients, we know, were credulous. MacArthur and Hecht may be forgiven their subscription to the myth that rascally reporters serve the public by saving us from rascally politicians (here, a corrupt mayor). Many myths are grounded in truth. But it's all too easy for writers to invent this particular one, all too convenient for media folks to spread it. Who among them acknowledges conflict of interest?

Several weeks ago this column (February 26), noted that over 500 films were released in 1987. This represented a 20 percent increase over 1986. The deluge continues: as of March, releases for 1988 were another 20 percent ahead of 1987. Who can keep up with the titles of most of these? (Alas, how can a biweekly column keep ahead of the death rate?)

But a note on the proliferation is in order. Cable TV companies are putting up much of the money for these marginal productions and as part of their contracts require release in several theaters or in several cities. The immediate result: films are released to too wide a market, fail to fill the theaters, and are withdrawn by distributors, even more rapidly than in the past. Films have even less time than books to "sit on the shelves" and wait for an audience to find them. The final result: cable companies get products into their networks sooner. Give *Switching Channels* about two months!

TOM O'BRIEN

STAGE

MADAME B.

FROM PUCCINI TO HWANG

In *The Dance and the Railroad* David Henry Hwang mixed Chinese opera and American history with such imagination and wit that the play established him in 1981 as an important new voice in American theater. Later that year, in *Family Devotions*, a "spiritual farce" by his own definition (*New York Times Magazine*, March 13 1988), Hwang proved so adept at broadly comic surfaces that some reviewers wrongly dismissed the play as an Asian-American sitcom. Now, in *M. Butterfly*, he has come to Broadway for the first time with a highly theatrical work

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

displaying familiar Hwang devices and themes in a blend that unintentionally asks whether Hwang is a serious dramatist or a show-biz magician. Even if some of the more flamboyant moments in the production belong to director John Dexter and designer Eiko Ishioka, this dichotomy has been evident in Hwang's work since his first play, *FOB*, back in 1979. Presumed dichotomy, actually, since the either/or is not mandatory. You could hardly tell from the current bland revival of *A Streetcar Named Desire* at the Circle in the Square, but the best American playwrights have always answered the question about seriousness vs. show business with, why not both at once.

M. Butterfly originated in a news story about a French diplomat and his Chinese lover, a star of the Beijing Opera, who were found guilty by a French court in 1986 of spying for China. The trial revealed, to the apparent surprise of the diplomat, that the presumed mother of his child was in fact a man. In the *Times* interview, Hwang described the story as "a perfect little jar" to contain "concerns that I have about racism, sexism, and imperialism." Less a jar than a Chinese box full of surprise doors and secret compartments, *M. Butterfly* is far removed from the skeletal news story. It is Hwang's imaginative construction of characters and events, filtered through the memories, the prejudices, the longings, the dreams of the French diplomat, here called René Gallimard, and played as a very American Frenchman by John Lithgow. This is a conscious choice, I assume, not a weakness in Lithgow's performance. Gallimard identifies with Lt. Pinkerton, the hero-villain of *Madame Butterfly*, in his longing for the perfect and perfectly submissive woman; and in the play's parody version of the story Puccini borrowed from David Belasco and John Luther Long, Lithgow plays Pinkerton as a macho American stereotype, the coarsest kind of sailor on the make.

Most of the characters in *M. Butterfly* are caricatures who play brief scenes that underscore the sexual and political ideas which are more fully realized in the shifting relationship between Gallimard and Song Liling, excellently acted by B. D. Wong, in and out of drag. The central male Western attitude—voiced more than once—is that woman wants to submit ("the eyes say yes while the mouth says no") just as the passive East, whatever its protestations, wants to be penetrated by the superior but beneficent West. For all the private and public chaos that such an assumption has visited on the world, the play is not making so direct a comment. *M. Butterfly* is interested, dramatically and ideationally, in the difficulty of defining sexual and political roles. In one of the teasing scenes in the play, Song Liling tells a female comrade who wears a sexless Red Guard uniform, that only a man knows what a woman should be. Female roles are traditionally played by men in Chinese opera, but when Gallimard, who first sees Liling singing Butterfly, finally visits her/him at the opera, she is playing a female warrior, besting the men around her. As a woman, he/she dominates Gallimard through submissiveness,



Congress on Religion and Politics:

Theologies of Peace and Justice

Chicago Theological Seminary

May 27-30, 1988

Plenary Speakers:
Jesse Jackson
Michael Harrington
Rosemary R. Ruether
Bonganjalo Goba
Cornel West
Arthur Waskow
James Cone
Jim Wallis
Vernon Bellecourt
John Cort
Rebecca Chopp
Harvey Cox
Michael Lerner
Schubert Ogden
Robert Aitken Roshi

Sponsors: Meadville-Lombard School of Theology, Religion & Socialism Commission of the Democratic Socialists of America, Unitarian-Universalist Dept. of Social Justice, U. of C. Div. Students for Responsible Action, Institute on the Church in Urban Industrial Society, UUs for Democratic Socialism, Church World Service of Greater Chicago
Endorsers: Rosemary Radford Reuther, Cornel West, Harvey Cox, Arthur Waskow, James Cone, Dorothee Solle, Gary Dorrien, Michael Harrington, J. Hughes, Bill Kuntze, John Cort

For conference information please contact:
Religion & Politics Congress, rm. 1201, 1608 N. Milwaukee, Chicago, IL 60647 (312) 252-1686

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

milking him for the secrets she passes on to her superiors. Gallimard is presented as a wimp who becomes sexually and professionally sure of himself because of his liaison with Liling, but in his other affair with a Westerner, it is the woman who is the aggressor. In a first transformation scene, Liling presumably becomes the man that he is, elegant in Western clothes; but since a change of costume is not a revelation, he finally strips so that Gallimard and the audience can see that he is a man. The only explanation for the diplomat's not knowing before is that he chose not to know anything that would interfere with his image of the ideal woman who loved him completely.

Gallimard goes to prison and Song Liling goes back to China, but Gallimard keeps saying that he wants to find another ending—the right one—for their story. Liling offers to continue the affair, but that would be play-acting for Gallimard, not the idealization that has let him call his lover Butterfly. He wants to believe that a woman can so worship an unworthy man that, by Puccini out of Belasco, she can kill herself for love. So Gallimard becomes Butterfly. He paints his face, puts on Liling's discarded robe, and commits the necessary suicide, while Liling, now the repentant male, stands above and calls out in a broken voice, "Butterfly. Butterfly." It is a wonderfully theatrical moment and it is possible that this scene—along with the Chinese opera battle, Liling's transformation, Wong's strip scene—will stay with the audience longer than the awful irony of the end and the implicit rejection of sexual and racial myths that it embodies. Which brings us back to the question in the first paragraph and the hope that seriousness and show business are not mutually exclusive.

GERALD WEALES

BOOKS

The twilight of the aging

SETTING LIMITS
Medical Goals in an Aging Society
Daniel Callahan
Simon and Schuster, $18.95, pp.

BORN TO PAY
The New Politics of Aging in America
Phillip Longman
Houghton Mifflin, $17.95, 308 pp.

Drew Christiansen

The United States has gone a long way toward eliminating poverty as a condition of old age in the years since Dr. Francis Townsend first agitated during the depths of the Great Depression for a national pension system. To be sure, there are still aged poor, but overall the grave needs which frequently degraded the elderly and overtaxed their families are now met by government entitlements like Social Security and Medicare. The problem, as Phillip Longman states it in *Born to Pay*, is that these universal entitlements for which old age is the only criterion assist rich and poor alike. The result is a pattern of taxation and distribution which places an excessive burden on younger generations and promises to mortgage the nation's future in a blind frenzy of deficit spending.

According to the Social Security Administration's "best-guess estimate" (1986), the Medicare trust fund will be depleted by 1996; the disability insurance fund will be exhausted by 2026; the Social Security pension fund will be in the red by 2020 and completely bankrupt by 2054. The answer, Longman offers in *Born to Pay*, is a need-based social insurance program funded by taxes on consumption.

Health care is the field in which disproportionate expenditure on the needs of the aged is plain to see. As a way of controlling the escalation of medical costs and correcting the skewed distribution of resources to the elderly, Daniel Callahan in *Setting Limits* rejects the criterion of "medical need" for a strict standard of age in the allocation of health care services. As a practical matter, he sets the late seventies or early eighties as a cut-off point for all but routine medical treatment. Men and women who have lived four-score years have lived out a "natural life span," he writes, in which "life's possibilities have on the whole been achieved and after which death may be understood as a sad but nonetheless relatively acceptable event."

Callahan's proposal means that first, government will be obliged to support only those life-extending technologies which would assist people in living out a natural life span. Second, only palliative treatment to relieve suffering ought to be provided for elders who have attained a natural life span.

Callahan has two motives in prescribing age as a norm for health care. First, like Phillip Longman, he is concerned about intergenerational justice. He believes health care resources as well as research spending are heavily skewed to the advantage of the elderly over against the general population, especially the young and the poor. Secondly, in technical medical terms he finds "need" an alluring, but exceedingly slippery norm.

Medical need tends to be defined by changing technology. Once organ trans-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

plants and bypass surgery become technically feasible, they become medically indicated. The prescription of such treatment for the elderly is not only extremely costly, but leads to still additional costs in the treatment of the chronic diseases which accompany extended life expectancy.

Callahan is sensitive to objections that an age criterion will be arbitrary and undermine the principles of medical need, patient preference in medicine, and "the moral virtues of charity and compassion" in American society. Callahan replies that he quite deliberately questions the individualist bias of medical practice and the ethic of unlimited compassion for those in need. "The high cost of health care, unrelenting technological developments, and the good of the elderrates a casuistry for treatment of diverse classes of the elderly (demented, severely ill but alert, physically vigorous).

The case for the age criterion runs into even more serious problems on the political plane. In interest-group democracy, as both Callahan and Longman acknowledge, there is no guarantee that savings from allocations for the elderly will go to other needy groups. As a condition of cost-cutting at the upper age limit, Callahan would require redistribution to currently disadvantaged groups whose chance for a healthful life in a normal age range would be increased by making greater health services available to them. As a practical matter, this proposal comes very close to recommending something like the British national health system.



ly themselves," he pleads, "require that [the presumption of patient interest] be examined afresh."

There is an intuitive plausibility to Callahan's proposal. People do possess a sense of natural life span. Most adults have known some old men and women who feel they have outlived their natural span of life. The general public is also uneasy about the often painful effects and excessive costs of aggressive medical interventions with the very frail and terminally ill.

At the same time, some people are very old at sixty; others are vigorous in their mid-eighties. Callahan himself, after playing down variations among the elderly, seems to acknowledge the relevance of such differences when he elabo-

But regrettably, Callahan retreats from this position because of that old bugbear, the authoritarianism implicit in rationalized (nonmarket) health care delivery. It is at this point that Longman's need-based criterion supported by a tax on consumption begins to make sense, as a morally defensible alternative within the limits of American politics.

The need standard, argues Longman, answers everyone's basic fear that old age will leave them ruined; but it cuts costs by denying payments to the affluent as long as they can afford to pay for their own care. Levies on consumption, he adds, will increase savings, thereby reducing the overconsumption which leads to deficit spending. Morally speaking, protection against catastrophic need represents an acceptable baseline for health care; politically, it is the kind of weak egalitarianism compatible with traditional American politics. The difficulty with this proposal is that the economic and technological trends are such that guaranteeing basic needs in an elusive compromise between the affluent and the disadvantaged may well prove insufficient to provide the required fiscal restraint.

Longman and Callahan agree that the reforms they propose will not be possible without a fundamental change in values. Ours is a culture, Longman laments, "that no longer believes in or cares about the future." Long-term thinking about the public good is needed. Callahan confesses that "only a full-scale change of habits, thinking, and attitudes would work to make [denial of Medicare coverage on grounds of age] morally and socially plausible."

Neither public policy analysis nor moral philosophy is likely to produce such a cultural revolution. Public policy can alter motives at the margin by behaviorist methods like tax policy, but it cannot alter deep-seated attitudes. Moral philosophy is still locked into an individualistic belief system which lies at the source of the problem, and the analytic style in moral philosophy prefers to raise objections and sustain doubts rather than to illuminate our moral convictions and practices.

A good example of the limits of contemporary philosophical ethics is Callahan's reasoning on filial obligation to elderly parents. While criticizing individualism, medical utilitarianism, and contractarianism as sources of the crisis in health care, Callahan's rational models for moral obligation come almost exclusively from those very sources. Again and again, Callahan falls back on emotive appeals to make the case for filial responsibility.

Both Longman and Callahan have defined a set of complex social questions for which the costs of old age are but a symptom. Each makes policy proposals which need debating. Callahan, in his characteristic and very successful role as worried ethicist, raises especially probing questions about geriatric ethics and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

social policy. Arriving at consensus on the solution to those issues will take long public debate. Even more, it will mean clarifying the meaning of the good life and the good society in a vision of human existence far deeper and richer than secular intellectualism can ever provide out of its own resources. □

THE IMPENETRABLE PINOCHET

CHILE: DEATH IN THE SOUTH
Jacobo Timerman
Translated from Spanish by Robert Cox
Alfred A. Knopf, $15.95, 134 pp.

Virginia M. Bouvier

An American journalist was once assigned to write a story on Chile. Equipped with dozens of phone numbers for his arrival in Santiago, he hopped on a plane. As the plane entered Bolivian territory on its way south, the journalist called out to the pilot, "Would you mind dipping to a lower altitude? I have to write about Bolivia next."

Despite the prominent credentials earned by his brilliant bestseller, *Prisoner Without a Name, Cell Without a Number*, Argentine writer Jacobo Timerman's latest book, *Chile: Death in the South*, reads like the journal of an Argentine correspondent who has taken on mission impossible. Through descriptive vignettes and moving testimonies, Timerman sets out to tackle the burning enigmas which have stumped Chilean experts for the last fifteen years: What must be done to restore Chile's 150-year tradition of democracy? Why can't the Chilean political leadership oust General Pinochet's military dictatorship? What is the appropriate response to the regime? As Timerman writes, "Every day brings a new proposal or another original initiative. And each day the never ending debate becomes more exhausting. Everything is debated in Chilean politics and everything is debatable." In the end, Timerman's comments on the various strategies available to the Chileans provide one more debatable alternative.

Given to hyperbole, Timerman's generalizations and abundant use of poetic license are at times misleading. He fails to capture, for example, that repression in Chile is now a fine-tuned instrument—a highly sensitive seismograph programmed to register and respond to the fluctuating moods of the country. Visitors to Santiago more often than not will find a stunningly attractive, modern cosmopolitan bustle that shows little hint of the vise of military rule. The more sensational techniques of repression dramatized in Chile—beheadings, immolations, and the disappearance of political opponents more common immediately following the September 11, 1973 coup, which overthrew the democratically elected government of Salvador Allende—are no longer the daily bread and butter of the regime. Nowadays, those more lurid techniques punctuate only intermittently the regime's more pernicious, quotidian use of legal niceties, the façade of due process, the combination of selective detentions with unacknowledged kidnappings and threats by unidentified individuals, and the never-ending enticement that a transition to democracy will come to those who wait. These insidious devices and the absolute lack of government accountability to the populace create an impenetrably pervasive layer of fear and frustration.

Timerman's division of the population into separate groups that adopt different coping mechanisms again masks the complexity of Chilean reality. Timerman paints his strokes broadly: some Chileans participate in an alternative subculture; others denounce their reality and are expelled; some find solidarity mechanisms; others maintain silence. But the lines are not so clear. Where, for example, would the host of journalists and editors of Chile's opposition magazines fall? What are the intellectual exercises that substitute for real resistance to the dictatorship? Timerman gets caught in his own contradictions—vacillating between a thinly veiled disdain for those who choose the alternative subculture and an admiration for those documenting the reality of the human rights abuses taking place in Chile.

With powerful imagery, Timerman compares the alternative lives in Chile with those of the ghettos of Nazi-occupied Poland. "During the Holocaust," he warns, "the Jews managed to create a life with theaters, schools, choirs, lectures, chess tournaments, even beauty contests. Each time, after the Nazis had transported thousands to the gas chambers and the ovens of the crematoria, the alternative life continued—for those who remained."

But Chile is not under Nazi occupation and its "alternative subculture" is not by any means a marginalized part of Chilean

THE MARAN GROUP

A Network of Former Women Religious

Dialogue —
sharing information,
insights,
and reflections

For more information:
The Maran Group
Suite 300, 6 Beacon St.
Boston, MA 02108
(617) 227-5500

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

society. Chile's alternative subculture encompasses over fifty high-level research institutions and a plethora of scholars, artists, writers, opposition politicians. According to Timerman, these form "the steam the military allows to escape so that the boiler will not explode." Timerman somewhat pretentiously prescribes that Chileans accept and decipher the present, instead of fighting to recover the past. "If the intellectuals would realize that the Chile they believed in was defeated and was vanquished, then they could clarify their ideas and develop a vision of the future. Denunciation is merely a lament in the global field of culture. Activism is merely a form of consolation. The truth is the only way to prophesy what the future holds; but it is impossible to get to the truth if only a part of reality is accepted." As though Timerman has a corner on the truth and the past can somehow be divorced from the present!

Sprinkled with sometimes humorous, often original, and always tragic anecdotes of how General Pinochet's repressive dictatorship reaches into the smallest corners of everyday life, *Chile* provides a mélange of characters, true-life situations, and, ironically, bountiful data, statistics, and ideas generated by the pharaonic "alternative subculture" Timerman clearly disdains. Drawing on the conclusions of a conference of psychologists, "The Culture of Fear in Totalitarian Regimes," he analyzes the behavior of the "Women of Calama," whose husbands were executed in the early days of the regime. These women have translated their pain and fear into silence—the dictatorship's preferred coping mechanism. Timerman relates, "As one of the objectives of inducing fear is to deprive an individual of his ability to act, the ordinary sense of reality is deliberately disrupted and rendered useless. It comes to seem practically impossible to verify what is objective fact as against subjective experience and the boundary between what is real and possible on the one hand and what is fantasy and imagination on the other tends to dissolve. Reality . . . so loses its guiding role in subjective processes."

Here Timerman has unwittingly stumbled upon a hidden and illuminating piece of the puzzle of Chile's political bottleneck. The culture of fear also creates a collective inability to act and warps perceptions of both what is and what is not possible. Such insights and other gems give plenty of food for thought, if the reader can overlook Timerman's often simplified and sometimes hasty interpretations of Chilean reality. □

WRESTLING WITH MODERNITY

TECHNOLOGY AND JUSTICE
George Parkin Grant
University of Notre Dame, $8.95, 135 pp.

J. M. Cameron

All George Grant's work has an unfashionable presupposition: that whatever we may think about this or that political problem there are lying behind our thinking theological or metaphysical issues about which little can be communicated directly but with which we must wrestle if we are to say anything worth heeding. Here the greatest influence upon him has been the work of Simone Weil. And behind Weil there is Plato; and Grant's Christianity is very much that of a Platonist.

Technology and Justice is a collection of essays on themes that interest Grant: the nature of modern technology and the forms of thought it nourishes and shapes; the multiversity; Nietzsche and ancient philosophy; research in the humanities; euthanasia; abortion, and human rights. In his treatment of all these questions, Grant betrays his conviction that our society, that of the opulent West, is in a very bad way, intellectually confused, morally blind, and bent on self-destruction. He recognizes that there is much that is admirable, much that is well-intentioned, in our society; but the mode of thought within which the achievements of technology have been made falls into sophistry and hubris in a moment, with its chatter about "quality of life," "personhood," and the like. We are now seeing in the liberal societies of the West the fulfillment of the dreams of National Socialism. Anything less than near-perfection in mind and body weakens a person's claim to life. The criteria for deciding who is to live, and under what conditions persisting life is to be allowed, are no longer racial; they are settled by educational and medical elites.

This is how Grant reads the fundamental tendencies of our society. We are not there yet, but he thinks this is the direction in which we are moving. We get the impression that while there is a duty to speak out against the horrors, actual and impending, our society is so trapped within certain intellectual categories that it is hard to explain to liberals and "progressive" persons in general just what the objections to current policies are. Talk about "the quality of life,"



LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"meaningful existence," and the rest is thought to be an expression of such benignity that it is senseless to criticize policies that invoke the language of "caring." We stumble into Nietzschean policies without having the Nietzschean clarity about what they amount to.

We have the idea that the instruments of technology "are neutral instruments in the sense that the morality of the goals for which they are used is determined outside them." That this is false is suggested by the irresistible—or almost so—impulse when faced with a problem thrown up by technology to look for a technological solution and to reject those approaches that seem to those reared in and by the technological society to be primitive or simple-minded. What counts, for us, as a solution to a social problem, has to have a technological form for it to have any plausibility. Of course, there are counter-examples, portents of what could turn out to be a counter-revolution. The development of hospices for the dying, and the growth among many physicians of a strong belief that a man or woman has the right to know about his or her actual condition, are instances of a humane and, as it were, pre-technological solutions to a social problem. And there are other heartening instances.

In his essay "Faith and the Multiversity," Grant illustrates the predicaments in which the elites of our society find themselves. Our elites have been brought up within the tradition of Descartes, not of Plato. The method of doubt is synonymous with rationality. For Plato (and Aristotle—Grant follows Simone Weil in strangely excluding Aristotle from the canon), justice and the good were primary realities about which men are bound to inquire; and this inquiry could only be pursued with effect by those who were in their educational regimen subjected to a training in good habits.

> Among the young, the cultivation of habit was considered central. Justice was, in its origins, good habit. The early practice of fulfilling some small segment of justice was necessary to the overcoming of self-assertion among the young. For those likely to rule this was not sufficient. It was necessary to understand justice within the whole scheme of the cosmos. When one compares the education of Queen Elizabeth the First, or of Gladstone, with that given to nearly all modern rulers, one may come to understand why they were such masters of what Plato called the highest art.

A sad confirmatory account of technological society's grappling with a problem is the present response to the AIDS crisis. It is taken for granted in Western society that sexual activity is inescapable for all normal people; that continence outside marriage is an impossible ideal — indeed, not an ideal at all — and that fidelity within marriage is too hard for most people, and may, in any case, be tedious and psychologically undesirable. Questions about heterosexual activity were bound to be raised once it became evident that AIDS was not uniquely tied to homosexuals. Everyone knows that the response of our society has not been to commend continence and chastity but rather to explain that those at risk — and everyone who leads a life of sexual activity with several partners is at risk — that they should go in for (comparatively) safe sex, oral, anal, or otherwise, using condoms. These forms of armor, as Boswell called them, are booming economically and are obtainable in a variety of sizes, colors, styles,

Edward Nobles

Heart Ear

To half hear
is to be without direction. Everything moves toward you from
the right.
Even a lover's kiss, on the earlobe of the
left, is felt, but slightly; the alluring breath
streams around the head and enters at
the other end of night: a spirit's touch
against the window. It flutters there, in the rain,
intent on entry, but it can not knock.

Is it the mystery, or the mistrust,
that the left ear fails to hear?

A child of five, fevered with measles, my heart-ear bled
and bottled-up with wax. The pain was fierce
and good for nothing but my mother's worried eye
which was worth a lot
in a house of seven peers. One night, the ear's shrieking
burnt a hole into the sheet. Or so it seemed, as I held my head
against the pillow and cringed inward; the aching entered
and endured.

Dead now, it treasures more
the subtle world of night. Sometimes,
the good ear's insight is so perfect
I can't bear my present life. It is then
the past crawls
all the way around the rim
of years, to tap lightly, like a spider,
against the senseless drum.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and flavors. So if you want a red-white-and-blue condom (such were to be had in 1976 and the machines that marketed them in washrooms bore the slogan "Have a bang for Old Glory") with ribbing and a cherry flavor I dare say this could be had. The boom in the manufacture of condoms is so great that it wouldn't be surprising if their entrepreneurs were to donate a proportion of their profits to the arming of the *contras*.

Grant is strong in description but weak in analysis. These valuable essays do not exhibit the full range of his talents. What this reviewer would like from him (I am sure I speak for many) is a critical account of his relation to his authorities, above all to Simone Weil and to Plato seen much as she sees him. There is something very strange about Simone Weil. There is her extraordinary enmity to the Old Testament, an almost Marcionite hatred of it (she once asked Père Perrin if it would be possible for the church to take a sunnier view of Marcion!). It was this, so Thibon believed, that kept her out of the church, with its insistence on the unity of the two covenants. Then, there is her venomous attack on Aristotle for his defense of slavery. Even one who finds Aristotle shocking in this matter must surely find him a liberal if he is compared to the author of *The Laws*. □

WHEN THERE WAS NO AID

AND THE BAND PLAYED ON
Politics, People, and the AIDS Epidemic
Randy Shilts
St. Martin's, $24.95, 630 pp.

Peter Marks

Back in January 1982 — when a disease that would become synonymous with certain, agonizing death did not yet have a name—a gay dermatologist and a gay political operative met for dinner in San Francisco to discuss a future that few others had dared to imagine.

The two men already had caught glimpses of the future. The doctor saw it in the growing number of young men with Karposi's sarcoma—a skin cancer that normally afflicts elderly Italian and Jewish men—showing up in his examining room; the politico saw it in the increasing ranks of acquaintances dying from a mysterious, wasting ailment.

What struck the two men on this winter evening, Randy Shilts reports in *And the Band Played On*, his exhaustive account of the early years of the AIDS epidemic, was their odd predicament. Their social world was under attack by a strange killer that their professional worlds, medicine and politics, were largely ignoring.

"This is going to be a world-class disaster," the doctor says to the aide. "And nobody's paying attention."

The dermatologist's observation encapsulates the central thesis of Shilts's sprawling book: that the medical and political establishments, largely because of homophobia and ignorance, failed—and in some cases, refused—to recognize the early warning signs, as Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome developed from a scientific curiosity into a full-blown epidemic.

Shilts, a *San Francisco Chronicle* reporter who has covered AIDS since the early 1980s, tracks the history of the disease in a book that is part political journal, part epidemiological diary. It's also an outstanding piece of reportage, for Shilts painstakingly documents the battles among the AIDS researchers, the complacency of mainstream politicians, and the timidity of gay leaders, all of which contributed to the lethargic pace of development of AIDS prevention and research.

Shilts argues that the slow response to the unfolding disaster, principally by the Reagan administration and officials in large cities like New York, allowed the disease to spread widely among gay men and other "high risk" groups, such as intravenous drug users and hemophiliacs. And he bitterly reports that journalists did not deem the disease worthy of serious, front-page treatment until 1985, when the world learned Rock Hudson had AIDS. But by then, Shilts says, there were nearly 50,000 cases of AIDS in 113 countries.

Concentrating on the years 1980 to 1985, Shilts's journal criss-crosses the country, from San Francisco, to New York, where AIDS was spreading fastest, and to Atlanta and Washington, where the researchers and policymakers tried (or failed) to deal with the problem. In laying out the progress of the disease in diary fashion, week by week, month by month, Shilts has found exactly the right format to make his case. He intersperses stories about AIDS sufferers with telling "inside baseball" tales of feuds between cancer researchers in various federal agencies, who were forced to vie for an extremely limited amount of AIDS research money.

The competition was also a clash of towering egos. One of the most telling stories in the book is the vicious, running

> *One evening, another steward was over at Gaetan's watching the news when Jerry Falwell came on, bellowing about AIDS and God's wrath. Gaetan grew sullen. His friend was surprised he didn't have some smart-ass comment.*
>
> *"Maybe Falwell is right," said Gaetan. "Maybe we are being punished."*
>
> —Randy Shilts
> *And the Band Played On*

fight between a prizewinning researcher at the National Cancer Institute, Bob Gallo, and the retrovirologists at the Louis Pasteur Institute in Paris. Gallo and the French scientists were both working in 1983 at isolating the viral agent

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that caused AIDS.

"Gallo . . . worried that the French would be proved right, and he would not get the credit for discovering the AIDS agent," Shilts writes. "Privately, he spread the word that the French isolates were not human viruses at all, but contaminants from other viruses kicking around the labs." It was backbiting of the most dangerous sort, the author suggests, for it impeded scientific cooperation at a time it was needed most.

Shilts, who is gay, was one of the first reporters in the United States to be assigned to AIDS as a fulltime beat. But as often happens to reporters on specialty beats, he is so consumed by his subject that in the course of a 630-page book, he buries the reader in endless, and often needless, detail. In fact, it sometimes seems as if the author had indiscriminately emptied the contents of the reporter's notebooks he has filled over the years. Was it necessary, for example, to reproduce the press releases of the American Medical Association in their entirety? In addition, the book sometimes falls into the jargon of "AIDS-Speak" that Shilts says he hates. (Unfortunately, the endless repetition of acronyms like HTLV-I and HTLV-II, NIH, NCI, CDC, FDA, GRID, KS, and PCP turns some sections of the book into alphabet soup.)

Shilts also has an irritating habit of congratulating his employer, the *Chronicle* (by which, of course, he means himself) for repeatedly scooping other newspapers on AIDS-related issues. But even so, he makes a compelling argument for the news media's lack of aggressiveness in covering the epidemic. He cites a University of California study that examined the relationship between news coverage and the municipal response to AIDS in two hard-hit cities, San Francisco and New York. The study showed that in San Francisco, where officials mobilized aggressively and early against the disease, the *Chronicle* had run sixty-seven front-page stories about AIDS between 1982 and 1985; in New York City, where much less money was dedicated to AIDS programs, the *New York Times* had run only seven front-page stories during the same period.

And the Band Played On is mostly about the impact of AIDS in the gay community. While there are a few anecdotes about those who have contracted the disease through blood transfusions or heterosexual sex, virtually no attention is given to another major high-risk group, intravenous drug users.

Still, the portraits of the gay victims of AIDS aren't always sympathetic.

There were, for instance, the doomed

REVIEWERS

DREW CHRISTIANSEN, S.J., *is associate professor of social ethics in the department of theology at the University of Notre Dame.*

VIRGINIA M. BOUVIER *is a senior associate of the Washington Office on Latin America and edits the bi-monthly* Latin American Update.

J. M. CAMERON *is emeritus professor of English and philosophy at St. Michael's College, Toronto, and author of* On the Idea of a University *(University of Toronto Press).*

PETER MARKS *is a reporter for* Newsday.

Significant Books for Commonweal Readers

"...A Powerful Example of History in the Making!"
—*The New York Times Book Review*

The Inside Stories
13 Valiant Women Challenging the Church
Edited by Annie Lally Milhaven



"A series of interviews with three nuns, two former nuns and eight other laywomen whose challenges to the Roman Catholic Church range widely. The 'inside story' is each woman's reflection on how she became disillusioned with a pope and a church that refuse to address what the interviewees perceive as the needs of Catholic women and respond instead through official reprimands, punishment, and alienation... There is a real kinship among these women..." —*The New York Times Book Review*

paper, 288 pages, $12.95

"People are beginning to acknowledge that perhaps (Thomas Berry's) are ideas whose time has come."
—*National Catholic Reporter*

Thomas Berry and the New Cosmology
Edited by Anne Lonergan and Caroline Richards



Cultural historian Thomas Berry is deeply concerned about keeping the world alive. His esteemed work at the Center for Religious Research has been critically analyzing the very dynamics of the planet earth and the role humans must fulfill within the entire universe. In Thomas Berry and the New Cosmology, you will confront "Geologian" Berry's 12 principles and share in a provocative dialogue with a group of respected theologians, a philosopher, and a scientist about Berry's views on religious unity and the world's economics and life systems. What they say will change how you think, challenge the way you see yourself and the world, and offer you a new vision of the created order — a new, living cosmology. **paper, 144 pages, $7.95**

Available in religious bookstores or directly from
XXIII Twenty-Third Publications, 185 Willow Street, Mystic, CT 06355
1-800-321-0411

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

dalliances of the so-called "Patient Zero" Gaetan Dugas, a Canadian airline steward who caught the virus early on and spread it to dozens of men that he picked up on his layovers in cities across North America. Dugas was like an AIDS sociopath: After having sex, Shilts reports, Dugas would point to the purple lesions on his chest, tell his partner that he had "gay cancer" and add that "Maybe you'll get it, too."

But Dugas is a minor player in Shilts's *Band*. The airline steward may have been the Typhoid Mary of AIDS, but Shilts says it was government bureaucrats and scientists, insensitive to the plight of "high risk groups," who succumbed to bias and failed to find out soon enough how to prevent the spread of the disease from one person to another.

"I think in the beginning of this whole syndrome, that they, over there, and a lot of other people said, 'Let the faggots die. They're expendable,' " a demonstrator with AIDS tells Shilts outside the White House in 1983. "I wonder if it would have been 1,500 boy scouts, what would have been done."

Shilts tends toward the melodramatic — every few pages, it seems, one of his interviewees is breathlessly observing that because of the disease, "The world will never be the same again." But even so, Shilts has given us a powerful, angry account of the bungling and bickering, the heartbreak and the heartlessness, of the early struggle against AIDS. □

CONCERNED?



Consider

A Peace Oriented Portfolio

PAX WORLD FUND, INC.

***"The Fund endeavors through its investment objectives to make a contribution to world peace."* — from the Prospectus**

by investing in:

- **non-war related industries**
- **companies exercising pollution control**
- **firms with fair employment practices**
- **international development**

Pax World is a no-load, diversified mutual fund designed for those who wish to develop income and to invest in life-supportive products and services. IRA and Keogh plans available. Minimum investment: $250.

This is not a solicitation in those states where the securities have not been qualified

A prospectus containing more complete information about Pax World Fund, including all charges and expenses, will be sent upon receipt of this coupon. Read it carefully before you invest. Send no money.

To:
PAX WORLD FUND, INC. ☐ **Send IRA Packet**
224 State Street
Portsmouth, N.H. 03801

Please send me a free prospectus and information on Pax World Fund.

Name _____

Address _____

City, State, Zip _____

Occupation _____

Telephone No. ☐ **Day** _____ ☐ **Evening** _____

CORRESPONDENCE

(Continued from page 226)

the Death Penalty isn't kind of trivial. After all, we are certainly more civilized than the Pakistanis.

But are the two systems so different because of the way the condemned spend their last few minutes of life? Of course not. LEIGH DINGERSON

The state's duty

Sheboygan, Wis.

To the Editors: It is obvious that Mr. Dieter is against the death penalty, but it is less obvious why. The journalistic opening and the rhetorical close of his article suggest that he is arguing an enthymeme, the suppressed premise of which would perhaps not be agreed upon by all his readers: That all Christians worth their gospel salt must be against capital punishment. But of course he may just be writing for liberals. . . .

That society which cannot deal efficiently with the perpetrators of heinous crime works for its own demise. It encourages two opposed reactions, both of which are inimical to its continued existence: (1) *Anomie*. Can anyone look at the basic contours of either our present system of interminable delays on death row *or* a system of liberalized life-sentences and say that the laws are just—that is, beautiful? The anomic individual with-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

draws into hopelessness, retiring from public concerns, for "there is no justice"; (2) The pre-emption of the function of the state by sub-groups within the state who *will* do justice for the aggrieved: the "brothers," the clan, the Mafia, Cosa Nostra, or the vigilantes in general. . . .

JOHN LYON

The society's right

Arlington Heights, Ill.

To the Editors: The death penalty is justified for two reasons. First, it helps deter crimes like premeditated murder. As the late FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover observed, "The professional law enforcement officer is convinced from experience that the hardened criminal has been and is deterred from killing based on the prospect of the death penalty." A 1970-1971 study by the Los Angeles Police Department buttressed Mr. Hoover's observation. Ninety-nine criminals participated in the study, each giving his reason why he committed his crime unarmed or did not use his weapon. The study revealed a 5-1 ratio of deterrence over non-deterrence as reported by those in the best position to make such a judgment: the criminals themselves.

Second, the death penalty is justified on moral grounds. When, for example, someone has raped and murdered a child, capital punishment is an act of retribution and demonstrates that a society and legal system genuinely are dedicated to preserving and protecting the rights and safety of the people. Charity also must be displayed towards the victims of crimes and their families.

If society has the moral right and obligation to act in collective self-defense against aggression emanating from *without,* then society likewise has the moral right and obligation to defend itself against aggression emanating from *within.*

HAVEN BRADFORD GOW

American Federation of Police

Discriminant church

Stow, Ohio

To the Editors: Your editorial "Time to Do Right," [January 29] noted the U.S. bishops' twenty-five-year-old statement about the duty of public authority to help correct the evils of unjust discrimination. From my seventy-three years of living in a Catholic environment, I see a church that has not felt this duty to be an important priority. To me even abortion is of lesser evil consequence. The marks of Catholicism — one, holy, catholic, apostolic, and white — are unlikely to be altered in a church that almost ignores racism in its teaching obligation. Thank you for this editorial reminder that our current federal administration is also insensitive on this issue.

R.C. WILSON

CLASSIFIED

RATES: 75¢ a word, one time; 68¢, three times; 64¢, six times; Classified payable with order; monthly in advance for more than three times. COMMONWEAL, 15 Dutch St., NYC 10038.

Benefactors Sought

BENEFACTORS sought, donations begged for struggling Mississippi mission. Dominicans labor here with local Catholic community to bring the Gospel to people with the scars of racial, social, religious division. Our financial resources: very limited; our work: preaching, evangelizing, parish, prison, community building. Write: Delta Dominican Ministries, Box 307, Rosedale, MS. 38769, ATT: Rev. Arthur Kirwin, O.P.

Priesthood

DESIRE PRIESTHOOD? Committed? Call 1-800-633-2252. Father Nigro, Gonzaga University, Spokane 99258.

Publication

Lost Tribe of Israel? Kinky new cult? No, just THE ORDINARY WAY, viewsletter of, by, for Christian laity seeking to connect work, life, faith. $8 year. PO Box 19339, Oakland, CA 94619.

Aging Religious: Our Responsibility

June 19-24, 1988. The Eleventh Annual Workshop for those working in retirement homes or programs for the aging in our religious communities. Also, optional Pre-Conference Seminar (June 16-18) for those new to this ministry. For brochure contact: Institute of Gerontology, College Misericordia, Dallas, PA 18612. Or call: (717) 675-3862. Registrations being accepted now.

Biblical Institute

23rd Biblical Institute, Trinity College Burlington, VT 05401, June 19-24. Faculty: Gerald O'Collins, Alice Laffey, William Holladay, Howard Clark Kee. Write: Sr. Miriam Ward.

Theology Workshop

24th Theology Workshop, St. Mary's College, Box AB, Moraga, CA 94575, June 20-24, Bernard Cooke: Liturgy in a Post-Vatican II Church. Write: Timothy McCarthy, Director.

20th Annual Institute on Sacred Scripture

August 7-12, 1988. Distinguished faculty: Diane Bergant, OSA; Jerome Murphy-O'Connor, OP; Daniel Harrington, SJ; Donald Senior, CP. For a brochure contact: Institute on Sacred Scripture, College Misericordia, Dallas, PA 18612. Or call (717) 675-3862. Registrations being accepted now.

MISSIONERS

Reach Out

"Come, Follow Me..."

...As a Missioner in Africa.

S.M.A. FATHERS
Society of African Missions

IF INTERESTED WRITE:
Fr. Joe Foley, S.M.A. Fathers
256 North Manor Circle
Takoma Park, MD 20912
301/891-2037

Co

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

WORDS that inspire, IMAGES that last

ONE MINUTE WISDOM
Anthony de Mello
With profound insight that embraces the wisdom of both East and West, this inspiring collection of lessons and parables offers daily renewal and lasting spiritual vitality. Each contemplation focuses on the goal of living a full yet simple life through the powerful promise of faith, love, and understanding. $7.95



NOTHING SHORT OF A MIRACLE
Patricia Treece
The infinite possibilities of faith and hope are confirmed in this fascinating collection of *true* stories of healings ascribed to saintly intercession. From St. Francis Xavier to Mother Seton, these extraordinary accounts testify to the power of prayer, and to the influential role of the saints in our spiritual lives. $7.95



THE MIRACLE OF LOURDES
Ruth Cranston
This fascinating new edition of an award-winning classic is a moving testament to the wondrous healing power of faith. Along with an absorbing history of the world-famous shrine, it presents new documentary evidence of genuinely miraculous cures, as well as the inspiring personal story of a woman restored to health by the mysterious grace of Lourdes. $8.95



THROUGH THE YEAR WITH THE SAINTS
M. Basil Pennington, O.C.S.O.
This unique, chronologically arranged compendium invites readers to "walk with the saints," day by day, as the year unfolds. Entries for each Catholic feast day present historical or personal notes, as well as an excerpt from the saint's life or teaching that provides an ideal focus for contemplation. $7.95

One faith, many images

Image Books/Doubleday

GCIU

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED